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9Abstract
This dissertation focuses on the expansion of expertise in the governance 
of science and technology. The phenomenon refers to the process of in-
creasing involvement of new actors in the debate and decision-making con-
cerning new applications of science and technology. This process has taken 
place in Western societies during the last decades due to an increased level 
of general education and emergence of new institutions, which enable new 
actors to participate and also critically evaluate issues that previously were 
the responsibility of scientists and technological experts alone. Modern bi-
otechnology is an example of an area in which these phenomena have had 
a central role in recent years.
The expansion of expertise raises issues that are interesting for research 
both theoretically and practically. Although this phenomenon can be inter-
preted through some existing theoretical frames, it also provides interest-
ing perspectives on how to renew those frames. For example, interesting 
questions are how and on what conditions the expansion of expertise takes 
place in different arenas of technical decision making, and how it happens 
in societies that are at different stages of development. From the practical 
point of the view, it is evident that an uncontrolled expansion of expertise 
can harm both the efficiency of scientific and technological development 
and those actors who do not benefit from their involvement or are not in-
terested in or are not provided the means to influence that development. 
Therefore, consideration of the expansion of expertise is necessary for prac-
tical reasons.
The key argument of this dissertation is that although previous theories 
have raised issues related to the expansion of expertise, this phenomenon 
is still viewed as separate from its context. Context here refers to the field 
in which the expansion of expertise takes place. In order to describe the 
context, the dissertation introduces the concept of “policy arena.” By com-
bining two dichotomic dimensions (actor induced: placid/polarized and in-
stitutional: hierarchic/participatory) four different types of arena are intro-
duced and explored. The framework is elaborated and tested through three 
types of triangulation: theoretical, methodological and empirical. Each type 
of arena favours different types of expertise, their expansion, conflicts and 
roles in decision-making. The concept of “arena effect” is proposed to de-
scribe the influence of different arena characteristics on the expansion of 
expertise.
Abstract
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The dissertation is an article dissertation, including four papers that are 
published in scientific journals and an extensive introductory chapter that 
discusses and weaves together the papers. The introductory chapter con-
tributes to the theory of the expansion of expertise, and comments on the 
recent debate on the so-called “normative theory of expertise.” The four ar-
ticles of the dissertation also contribute to specific research questions that 
are related to citizen participation, risk pre-assessment, foresight and re-
search education.
 
Keywords
arena effect, biotechnology, citizens, expansion of expertise, foresight, gov-
ernance, participation, policy arena, requisite variety, risk, science and tech-
nology policy
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Tiivistelmä
Asiantuntijuuden laajentuminen tieteen ja teknologian hallinnassa 
Väitöskirja keskittyy asiantuntijuuden laajentumiseen tieteen ja teknolo-
gian hallinnassa. Ilmiöllä tarkoitetaan länsimaisissa yhteiskunnissa viime 
vuosikymmeninä tapahtunutta uusien toimijoiden mukaan tuloa tieteen 
ja teknologian sovelluksia koskevaan keskusteluun ja päätöksentekoon. 
Koulutustason nousu ja uusien instituutioiden muodostuminen ovat anta-
neet aiempaa useammille toimijoille ja kansalaisryhmille mahdollisuuden 
osallistua ja kriittisesti arvioida asioita, jotka aikaisemmin kuuluivat vain 
teknologian kehittäjien ja asiantuntijoiden vastuulle. Moderni bioteknolo-
gia on esimerkki alasta, jolla nämä ilmiöt ovat Suomessakin olleet viime 
vuosina keskeisessä roolissa.
Tutkimuksellisesti asiantuntemuksen laajentuminen on kiinnostava il-
miö sekä yleisteoreettisesti että käytännölliseltä kannalta. Vaikka laajentu-
misen prosessi on tulkittavissa jo joidenkin olemassa olevien teoriakehys-
ten avulla, samalla se tarjoaa kiinnostavia mahdollisuuksia näiden kehys-
ten uudistamiseen. On esimerkiksi kiinnostavaa, miten ja millä ehdoin asi-
antuntemuksen laajeneminen tapahtuu erilaisilla tiede- ja teknologiapää-
töksenteon areenoilla ja eri kehitysvaiheissa olevissa yhteiskunnissa. Käy-
tännölliseltä kannalta on ilmeistä, että asiantuntemuksen hallitsematon 
laajeneminen voi aiheuttaa haittaa sekä tieteen ja teknologian kehittämi-
sen tehokkuudelle että niille osallistumaan joutuville tahoille, jotka eivät 
hyödy osallisuudestaan tai joille ei tarjoudu mahdollisuutta tai joilla ei ole 
edes kiinnostusta vaikuttaa kyseessä olevaan kehittämiseen. Tämän vuoksi 
asiantuntijuuden laajentumisen pohtiminen on myös käytännölliseltä kan-
nalta tarpeellista.
Väitöskirjan keskeinen argumentti on, että vaikka asiantuntemuksen 
laajentumiseen vaikuttavia tekijöitä on nostettu esiin aiemmissa tutkimuk-
sissa, ilmiö nähdään edelleen liian riippumattomana kontekstistaan. Tällä 
tarkoitetaan sitä kenttää, jolla asiantuntijuuden laajentuminen tapahtuu. 
Tämän kontekstin kuvaamiseksi väitöskirjassa esitellään politiikka-aree-
nan käsite. Yhdistämällä kaksi dikotomista ulottuvuutta, (toimijalähtöinen: 
vakaa/polarisoitunut ja institutionaalinen: hierarkkinen/osallistuva) tar-
kasteltavaksi tuodaan neljä erityyppistä politiikka-areenaa. Kehystä raken-
netaan ja testaan teoreettisen, metodologisen ja empiirisen triangulaation 
avulla. Keskeinen havainto on, että kukin areenatyyppi suosii tietynlaista 
asiantuntijuutta sekä sen laajentamiseen liittyviä asetelmia ja konflikteja. 
Tiivistelmä
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Väitöskirjassa luodaan areenavaikutuksen (arena effect) käsite kuvaamaan 
erityyppisten areenoiden vaikutusta asiantuntijuuden laajentumiseen.
Väitöskirja on tyypiltään artikkeliväitöskirja, jossa neljä julkaistua tie-
teellistä artikkelia sidotaan yhteen erillisen laajan johdantoluvun avulla. 
Johdantoluvussa kehitetään teoriaa asiantuntijuuden laajentumisesta ja 
kommentoidaan viimeaikaista keskustelua asiantuntijuuden normatiivi-
sesta teoriasta (normative theory of expertise). Väitöskirjan neljä artikke-
lia luovat lisäksi uutta tietoa erityiskysymyksistä, jotka liittyvät kansalais-
ten osallistumiseen, riskien ennakkoarviointiin, ennakointitoimintaan ja 
tutkijakoulutukseen. 
Avainsanat
areenavaikutus, asiantuntijuuden laajentuminen, bioteknologia, enna-
kointi, kansalaiset, osallistuminen, politiikka-areena, riskit, teknologinen 
variaatio, tiede- ja teknologiahallinta 
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The fact that order and creativity are complementary has been basic to 
man’s cultural development; for he has to internalize order to be able to give 
external form to his creativity. Otherwise, as the painter Delacroix lamented 
in his diary, his tumultuous imagination would erupt in more images than 
he is able to hold together or utilize, as in fact it often does in nocturnal 
dreams. 
 - Lewis Mumford (1967, p. 39)
1  Introduction2
The governance of science and technology (S&T) has traditionally been the 
business of dedicated experts and authorities. In some cases, such as when 
making decisions about funding research in astronomy or establishing a 
new research programme in steel technology, it may still be that way. In 
other cases, such as when defining future strategies for research and de-
velopment (R&D) in alternative energy, or making decisions about the ap-
plication of plant gene technology in an ecosystem context, the situation 
is different. There are multiple critics, stakeholders, industrial players, con-
sumers, citizens and counter-experts who have a say in the topic under de-
cision. Many observers of governance processes currently think that the 
more uncertainty and ambiguity related to the issues to be decided, the 
greater the need for involving a large variety of experts and other societal 
actors. Still others think that such “expansion of expertise” only endangers 
rational and responsible decision-making. The opinions on this issue re-
main divided.
My own first encounter with the dilemma related to the “expansion 
of expertise” was in 1997, when as a young researcher I had the opportu-
nity to participate in the first parliamentary technology assessment study 
in Finland. The assessment was of plant gene technology in food produc-
tion (Salo, et al. 1998), and I was included in an expert team whose other 
members were a professor in plant physiology and a professor in systems 
analysis. Having just finished my MA thesis on Mumford’s (1970; 1967; 1963) 
elaborate argument about expert domination in technological develop-
ment, I was suddenly to become a representative of the expert cohort. Our 
task team analysed the implications of plant gene technology from various 
knowledge perspectives: technical, ethical, health-related, environmental, 
social, economic and regulatory. Due to the broad scope of the assessment, 
we had to gauge alternative perspectives and arguments, and thus expand 
our own restricted expertise through more than fifty interviews with ex-
perts and stakeholders from relevant fields. While I was proud of the final 
achievement of our work, a 200-page report, something bothered me when 
it was placed on top of the half-meter-tall pile of documents that was de-
mikk rask Expansion of Expertise.indd   14 3.6.2008   17:31:08
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livered to each of the parliamentary members of the Committee for the Fu-
ture, our main customer. 
My concern was triggered by a reaction from a parliamentarian, later 
to become Minister of Labour, Tarja Filatov, who said that the whole tech-
nology assessment business would occupy only a handful of technically 
trained and technophilic members of the parliament. She pointed out that 
none of the parliamentarians could devote much of their time to the read-
ing of exhaustive reports in the midst of continuous information overload 
(see Rask, et al. 1999, p. 123-124). If Mumford’s thinking had convinced me 
that there are serious problems with narrow and technocratic decision-
making on S&T, my first experience with technology assessment only rein-
forced it by revealing that it is difficult to broaden the institutionalized in-
terests in technological issues.
The analysis of difficulties concerning the expansion of expertise in the 
Finnish arena of S&T became the starting point of this dissertation. I soon 
figured out that particular aspects of this arena may have an impact on 
the way in which decision-making and expert advice are organised. One 
of those aspects is, as I realised through personal observations and related 
studies (Eela 2001; Lemola 2001; Rask 2001), the high level of trust in experts 
and authorities. My view is shared by two Finnish researchers, Kuitunen 
and Lähteenmäki-Smith (Manuscript), who state that Finnish technology 
policy is elitist and undemocratic: decisions are taken by experts and civil 
servants with a technical background, not by elected politicians or parlia-
mentarians. They explain that tendency by the fact that issues of R&D are 
generally perceived as being distant from everyday life and therefore re-
quiring technical expertise that politicians and citizens lack. 
The reverence for experts, however, is not only a Finnish idiosyncrasy. 
Martin (1990, p. 14-16), for instance, has claimed that the standard model of 
technical decision-making in Western societies remains one where politi-
cians and government bureaucrats make decisions on the basis of advice 
from experts. Schwarz and Thompson (1990, p. 14-16) explain that the es-
tablished way of thinking about the nature of science and technology deci-
sion-making sees it as having a “substantive technical core.”3
A high level of techno-optimism and a lack of public criticism are other 
particular elements in the Finnish science and technology policy arena. A 
relevant example is the common perception among Finns of the applica-
tions of modern biotechnology. While the great majority of Europeans op-
pose genetically-modified (GM) food, the perceptions of Finns have gener-
ally been surveyed as being positive to it (Gaskell, et al. 2003; Midden, et al. 
2002). Another example is the decision in 2000 by the Finnish municipality 
of Eurajoki to accept, as the first municipality in the world, the deposition 
of high-level nuclear waste in its bedrock (Kojo 2005, p. 6). Both issues have 
stimulated some degree of public debate in Finland. Compared to many 
other Western countries, however, the debates have been modest and have 
1  Introduction
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generally not resulted in serious legitimacy crises over public policy-mak-
ing (see, e.g., Bauer & Gaskell 2002; Durant, et al. 1998). 
In addition to the previous examples, there is also more generic evi-
dence of the Finns’ positive attitude to their scientific and technological in-
stitutions. According to a recent science barometer (TSV 2004), for exam-
ple, based on a survey of 1054 randomly selected citizens, more than 70% of 
Finns have a high trust in universities, and 64 % in research organisations, 
while half of the population has a high trust in national research funding 
agencies, such as the Academy of Finland and Tekes, the Finnish Funding 
Agency for Technology and Innovation. By comparison, only 23% of Finnish 
citizens have a high trust in non-governmental organisations and 10% in 
political parties (Naumanen 2004; Tiedebarometri 2001).
There are no straightforward ways, however, of measuring trust in ex-
perts or public understanding of science and technology. Surveys in par-
ticular can be criticized, since they do not take into account different kinds 
of public understanding of science (see, e.g., Hill & Michael 1998). There are 
also semantic problems that can lead to paradoxical conclusions, such as 
the 1997 Eurobarometer on biotechnology, according to which the same 
Finns who at that time were positive toward “biotechnology” were at the 
same time among the most negative toward “genetic engineering” (Miet-
tinen & Väliverronen 1999, p. 17-18; EC 1997). Despite the analytical qualifi-
cations, taken together, the historical trends, survey findings, personal ob-
servations and similar interpretations by other researchers support the hy-
pothesis of the particular nature of the arena of Finnish science and tech-
nology policy. Policy-making is elitist and expert-driven, and it is embedded 
in a techno-optimist and consensual cultural environment.
Miettinen and Väliverronen (1999) explain the consensual nature of 
Finnish science policy with the special political and economic history of 
Finland, which is characterized by strong legalism, orientation toward con-
sensus and lack of tradition in critical debate (see also, Rusanen 2002). They 
argue that science and technology are seen in Finland as a continuation of 
a nation-building project, and thus as something of common national in-
terest. Lähteenmäki-Smith and Kuitunen (2006), who recently conducted 
a survey of the actors in Finnish technology policy, explain its elite-based 
structure through the success it is broadly perceived to have had in recent 
decades. Finland has ranked high in several international comparisons of 
investments in the R&D sector and in competitiveness more generally.4 In 
other words, the high rate of success can suffocate critical perspectives and 
calls for change.
In my view, both kinds of explanation are needed to account for the par-
ticularities of the conduct and context of Finnish science and technology 
policy. What we do not understand very well yet are the implications of 
those characteristics for the development and renewal of governance prac-
tices. Is there a danger of an institutional lock-in due to the good perform-
mikk rask Expansion of Expertise.indd   16 3.6.2008   17:31:08
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ance indicators and the “placidity” of the context? How can the Finnish sys-
tem implement the requirement of the European Commission to have more 
inclusive forms of governance in the field of biotechnology, for example (EC 
2002a, 2001)? How can the Finnish system adapt to the supposedly increas-
ing complexity and prominence of the social context of science and tech-
nology? In order to tackle these questions and also to re-examine whether 
they are based on valid assumptions about the nature of Finnish S&T pol-
icy and its arena, a set of additional questions arises: Who are the current 
actors in science and technology policy-making? What issues are consid-
ered relevant for policy-making? How are issues included in or excluded 
from the agendas of decision-making? What kinds of option and threat do 
the actors see for institutional renewal?
One of the main problems for Finnish S&T policy is that despite increas-
ing calls for the renewal and democratization of policy, the actual changes 
have often been minor.5 However, this is neither a Finnish nor a recent 
problem only, as literature describing different countries and contexts of 
S&T policy indicates.6 Even though some new practices of what I call “ex-
panded expertise” have been introduced and others have been tested dur-
ing last decade or two, there also seem to be more general factors that de-
limit the good intensions for renewal and democratization.
My contribution to these issues is based on the articles of this disser-
tation that analyze the process of the “expansion of expertise”7 from vari-
ous points of views in the Finnish context and beyond. The main focus of 
the articles is on two different policy arenas: biotechnology policy-mak-
ing and foresight activity (Papers I-III). My understanding and theorizing 
of the “arena effect” draw largely from the empirical findings of these pa-
pers. Paper IV has a more self-reflective role in the dissertation. It studies 
the changing condition of the doctoral dissertation process and the increas-
ing pressure of “extra-academic” criteria on research education. Research 
education can be understood as the “upstream” of expertise8, in which ac-
ademically-certified experts are trained. Policy-making and public contro-
versies over new technologies are the “downstream,” where the adequacy 
of their expertise is tested. As will become clear, the expansion of expertise 
raises issues in both contexts. 
In addition to the issues of the expansion of expertise, the papers in-
cluded in this dissertation also contribute to more specific discussions and 
research questions. The research topics and approaches of the four papers 
are summarized in Table 1.
1  Introduction
mikk rask Expansion of Expertise.indd   17 3.6.2008   17:31:08
Rask – Expansion of Expertise in the Governance of Science and Technology18
Table 1 Research topics, approaches and methods
Paper Research topic Research approaches and methods
I
Citizen participation and  
policy styles
Case study, categorization, 
discussion
II
Risk pre-assessment and  
dynamics of risk processes
Case study, discussion,  
methodological elaboration, 
social arena analysis,  
theoretical reconstruction
III
Foresight and the trade-
off between variety and 
convergence
Comparative case study,  
conceptual refinement,  
discussion, qualitative theory-
building and testing
IV
Changes in the modes of  
research education
Conceptual refinement,  
discussion, participatory  
observation, surveying
An overview of the main themes of the papers is given in Table 2. (Full 
abstracts, identifying the themes, approaches, theoretical discussions and 
main results of the papers are provided in Appendix 1).
“Expansion of expertise” refers to the process of involvement of new ac-
tors and knowledge perspectives beyond the academically and profession-
ally established elite. It is a multiform process that raises also broader is-
sues than the mere difficulty of introducing new actors in established 
structures of policy and debate. In this introductory chapter I take a syn-
thetic look at this phenomenon and try to understand and interpret its dy-
namics and limits at a more general level. For this purpose, I review schol-
arly discourses on issues related to the expansion of expertise. From this 
literature, I reconstruct some key arguments concerning the social driving 
forces of this phenomenon (as it happens as a spontaneous social process); 
identify emerging policy approaches based on the expansion of expertise; 
look at the rationales for adopting such strategies; and finally, review the 
recent discussion on the so-called normative theory of expertise that deals 
with the challenge of finding reasonable limits to the expansion process. As 
a result of this literature study, I define the three general research questions 
of the dissertation—all relating to the characteristics of different types of 
policy arena and their influence on the expansion of expertise.
Mobilizing the empirical findings of the four papers of the dissertation 
and reflecting on them in light of other scholarly research puts me in a po-
sition to answer the research questions. There are distinct characteristics 
in the policy arenas that create what I call an “arena effect” that influences 
the way in which strategies based on the expansion of expertise can be 
performed. My thesis thus become that earlier theories of the expansion of 
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Table 2 An overview of the papers
Paper I The first paper is a study of citizen participation and policy 
styles in Finnish biotechnology policy. The paper explores how citizen 
and stakeholder inputs are conveyed into the practice of policy-mak-
ing and how policy-makers think those inputs should be integrated. 
The study concludes that policy-makers have conflicting ideas of the 
appropriate role of citizens and stakeholders in the control of biotech-
nology. The paper argues that new participatory practices cannot be 
effectively adopted and developed, if they are largely incompatible 
with existing policy styles and thinking patterns.
Paper II The second paper elaborates a method for risk pre-assess-
ment and analyses how the emergence and intensification of a risk 
conflict challenged policy-making in the arena of Finnish forest bio-
technology. In this paper I study the actors and issues of the conflict, 
and explore the dynamic of the risk process. The study identifies par-
alyzing tendencies in the making of Finnish forest biotechnology 
policy. These are explained through the emergence of three “closure 
mechanisms”: “closure by redefinition of authority,” “closure by polar-
ization” and “closure by exclusion.” Finally, the paper explores options 
for policy intervention.
Paper III The third paper is a comparative case study of the actors and 
their involvement in a sample of foresight exercises in fifteen Euro-
pean countries. The study examines the breadth and depth of partici-
pation in foresight, and foresight coordinators’ experiences with the 
increasing of “requisite variety,” the variety of actors and knowledge 
perspectives. The study reports supportive evidence for the existence 
of a trade-off between high “requisite variety” and productive conver-
gence. Paper III also specifies and exemplifies the trade-offs, and col-
lects lessons on how to reconcile the mutually exclusive inclinations.
Paper IV The fourth paper discusses the “Mode 2 effect” on research 
education. A distinction between two types of university depart-
ments, Mode 1 and Mode 2, is suggested. The paper focuses on “Mode 
1 departments in transition” and discusses the means whereby they 
can renew and expand their research education content, in a way that 
helps future experts better cope with the rapidly changing and tur-
bulent social context of research. We suggest several measures that 
support doctoral students in communicating across epistemic bound-
aries and developing additional academic skills. Paper IV argues that 
a trade-off between Mode 1 and Mode 2 types of skills and curricula is 
needed in research education.
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expertise have not paid enough attention to phenomena depicted by the 
notion of “arena effect.” Consequently, increasing sensitivity to the arena 
effects helps better understand the dynamics and limits of the expansion 
process, and provides new insights for the design of future S&T policies.
The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured as follow. Sec-
tion 2 is a presentation of the theoretical discussions and the “problema-
tique”9 related to the expansion of expertise. I also explain the selected ter-
minology and define three overarching research questions that orient the 
discussion of the following sections. The overall research questions are de-
tailed at the end of the theoretical section (Section 2.7). Section 3 provides 
an overview of the research methodology and methodological principles 
adopted in the papers. Section 4 responds to the research questions and ex-
plores, on a more synthetic level, the expansion of expertise and its limits. 
Section 5 concludes the introduction by suggesting new directions for the 
study of the expansion of expertise. 
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2   Expanding expertise:  
theoretical issues and problems
Issues related to the expansion of expertise are discussed in a number of 
scholarly discourses. The social study of science and technology (e.g., Col-
lins & Evans 2002; Jasanoff, et al. 1995), sociology of public understanding 
of science (e.g., Irwin 1995; Wynne 1995), risk studies (e.g., Jaeger, et al. 2001; 
Slovic 2000) and studies in technology assessment and foresight (e.g., Joss 
& Bellucci 2002b; Martin 1996) are academic fields that are most closely 
linked to this dissertation. A commonly shared premise in those discourses 
is the idea that rationalistic, technology-centred and expert-based decision-
making in science and technology is in a state of crisis. The controversy 
over biotechnology, one of the main empirical cases of this dissertation, has 
often been used as an example of two symptoms of the crisis: the insuffi-
ciency of democratic legitimacy and the difficulty of effective policy-mak-
ing (see, e.g., Bauer & Gaskell 2002; Gaskell & Bauer 2001; Levidow 1999b; 
Durant, et al. 1998). Expansion of expertise, and the introduction of par-
ticipatory forms of governance in particular, have generally been recom-
mended as remedies to the assumed problems of technical decision-mak-
ing (see, e.g., Asselt, et al. 2001; Frewer, et al. 2001; Klüver, et al. 2000; SPP 
1999; Joss & Durant 1995).
Along with the increasing adaptation, experience and evaluation of the 
participatory approach, attention has focused on the need to define its rea-
sonable limits. An example is Collins and Evans’s (2002) proposition for a 
“Normative Theory of Expertise” (NTE). Their paper has sparked much dis-
cussion (Sismondo 2008; Lynch & Cole 2005; Collins & Evans 2003; Jasanoff 
2003; Rip 2003; Wynne 2003; Collins & Evans 2002; Gorman 2002), which 
indicates the topicality of the issue.10 The sharp tone of their commenta-
tors, however, points to a potential difficulty in the formulation of an NTE.
In the subsequent paragraphs of this theoretical section, I invite the 
reader to follow what is already known about the phenomenon of expan-
sion of expertise, and to consider what still remains to be known. In partic-
ular, I discuss the following questions: How should the expansion of exper-
tise (and its neighbouring concepts) be defined? What are the social driving 
forces of the expansion of expertise? What kinds of practices, approaches 
and policy initiatives are attached to it? What rationales has it been as-
cribed as a strategy for policy-making? How are the limits of the expansion 
of expertise defined by normative theories of expertise? And, finally, point-
ing to my own particular research questions: How do the different charac-
2  Expanding expertise: theoretical issues and problems
mikk rask Expansion of Expertise.indd   21 3.6.2008   17:31:08
Rask – Expansion of Expertise in the Governance of Science and Technology22
teristics of policy arenas (creating an “arena effect”) influence the expan-
sion of expertise? Can better knowledge of the “arena effects” help in the 
design of better strategies? 
Since I find Collins and Evans’s (2002) proposition for an NTE a theoreti-
cally interesting and noteworthy attempt to study the limits of the expan-
sion of expertise, I take some of their notions as the starting point for my 
discussion. Since I do not share their conceptual starting points completely, 
however, I make a tactical move and adopt the term “expansion of exper-
tise”11 (instead of their parallel term, “extension of expertise”) as the key 
concept of this dissertation. In so doing, I hope to make clear the main dif-
ferences between the approach of this dissertation and that of Collins and 
Evans. One of those differences is that I explore the arenas and limits of the 
expansion of expertise mainly from an empirical and contextual viewpoint, 
whereas Collins and Evans explore the limits axiomatically, as a theoretical 
dilemma. Another difference, a consequence of my empirically grounded 
approach, is that I take expertise to be interwoven with human and politi-
cal interests, whereas Collins and Evans aim at distilling “pure” forms of ex-
pertise based on the quality and status of propositional knowledge.
2.1 Key concepts12
Expertise, notwithstanding the tactics discussed above, is the focal concept 
of this dissertation. I understand it generally as either experience-based 
or academically certified knowledge, skills and competences.13 According 
to Abbott (1988, p. 16), the structural form of expertise is called a “profes-
sion.” The latter is constituted by organisations for managing associations, 
for control and for work. Culturally, professions legitimate their control by 
attaching their expertise to values with general cultural legitimacy and, as 
Abbott argues (op. cit.), the emphasis is increasingly on values such as ra-
tionality, efficiency and science.
By the expansion of expertise, I refer to the process of involvement of 
new actors and knowledge perspectives beyond technically or profession-
ally certified elites. This is an abstract way of referring to the broadening 
of the actor basis in decision-making related to science and technology. 
However, consideration of the implications of the involvement of un-estab-
lished actors (e.g., laymen or businessmen participating in the risk man-
agement of genetically modified organisms) entails issues exceeding the 
mere number of social interactions and knowledge components. The new 
actors bring along different professional cultures, worldviews and knowl-
edge perspectives. They also exercise new ways of negotiation, influence 
and agreement. Assuming that a productive interplay between the differ-
ent actors (and what they represent) is an intended goal, this requires new 
kinds of competences by the “organisers,” or “coordinators.” They have to be 
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able to arrange the new processes in a productive way and then absorb the 
heterogeneous results of those processes. The expansion of expertise is a 
multiform process.
Collins and Evans (2002) describe this process (which they call the “ex-
tension of expertise”) in a similar way. They equate the process with the 
widening of the domain of technical decision-making beyond the techni-
cally qualified elite (op. cit., p. 235). They often refer to “public participation” 
in decision-making and, in more technical terms, to the widening of the ac-
tor basis of technical decision-making beyond the core of certified experts 
through the involvement of non-experts and experience-based experts.14 
Collins and Evans (2002, p. 249), however, make an explicit distinction 
between “rights based on expertise” and “rights accruing to other stake-
holders.” The former are based on competence, the latter on political inter-
ests. While such a distinction can be theoretically instructive, and even sup-
ported with relevant arguments (they aim at a normative theory of exper-
tise, and therefore make a prescriptive assumption), it is nevertheless too 
rigid a starting point for empirical research. In a risk conflict or similar pol-
icy process, the borderline between scientifically and politically legitimized 
roles of the actors is constantly under review. This is also the perspective of 
the social arena theory applied in Paper II (and resource mobilization the-
ory more generally): the “rights” of the actors, being either experts, public 
authorities or other stakeholders, are to a large extent earned in a “game” 
in which various social resources are needed to make an impact. (This is 
not to deny that there are also institutional rules that deliver the rights.) 
Thus, for example, if policy-makers perceive themselves as marginalized in 
such a game, they can proceed to acquire strategic competences, e.g., in risk 
communication (cf., Levidow 1999a, p. 61); as the official expertise is recon-
stituted, this can lead to a shift in the policy process, and in the way that 
the rights of actors are delivered. Another example, from the study of or-
ganizational fields (Greenwood, et al. 2002; Abbott 1988), is that even the 
self-control (and jurisdiction) of professions through professional associa-
tions is political in nature. The point is that the scientific and political com-
ponents in the making of expertise are interwoven. An empirical study of 
the “expansion of expertise” therefore cannot be based on a narrow (or the-
oretically predefined) understanding of the constituents of expertise.
The domain of technical decision-making is where Collins and Evans 
make their key argument. They define it as follows:
 By “technical decision-making” we mean decision-making at those points 
where science and technology intersect with the political domain because 
the issues are of visible relevance to the public: should you eat British beef, 
prefer nuclear power to coal-fired power stations, want a quarry in your 
village, accept the safety of anti-misting kerosene as an airplane fuel, vote 
for politicians who believe in human cloning, support the Kyoto agree-
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ment, and so forth. These are areas where both the public and the scien-
tific and technical community have contributions to make to what might 
once have been thought to be purely technical issues. (Collins & Evans 
2002, p. 236)
The definition of “technical decision-making” is, for Collins and Evans 
(2002), wide-ranging, since it covers two broad domains, that of the politi-
cal on the one hand and that of science and technology on the other.15 All 
of their examples of decision-making, however, refer to situations in which 
the scope of decision is between conflicting alternatives, such as: should 
you eat British beef (or not); want a quarry in your village (or not)? These 
examples open a narrow and “tip of the iceberg” view of decision-making. 
It is true that people encounter such choice questions in their everyday 
lives; if not through personal decision-taking, then at least through media 
and public debates. Equally true, however, is that all choice situations are 
preceded by often long and complicated processes of agenda-setting. For 
example, the way in which the consumption of beef in Britain is subjected 
to (special) control and monitoring, as part of the nutritional risk man-
agement system, influences decisions on beef-eating. Since an increasing 
number of people are not only influencing decision-making in the narrow 
sense, but also the processes of technical agenda-setting, a broad view of 
influence is needed to cover these different aspects. In Paper II, following 
Lukes (1974) and Hukkinen (in press; 2002b), I have adopted a broad con-
ception of technical decision-making, consisting of three dimensions: “de-
cision-making” (in the narrow sense), “agenda setting” and “interest shap-
ing.” Despite risking a schematic (and thus simplistic) approach to the 
study of technical decision processes, I think that the view of three-dimen-
sional power helps make important distinctions that would otherwise be 
neglected.
In the title of this dissertation I have adopted the term governance to re-
fer to (technical) decision-making in the public domain. “Governance” is a 
general but contested concept among political scientists (see, e.g., Lyall & 
Tait 2005; Heffen, et al. 2000; Rhodes 1996). According to Renn’s (2005, p. 78) 
general definition, it refers (at the national level) to “. . . the structure and 
processes for collective decision-making involving governmental and non-
governmental actors.”16  I use the term “governance” as an umbrella con-
cept, to refer to the decision processes in the policy arenas that are ana-
lyzed in the articles of this dissertation. Due to this pragmatic intent, I am 
not going to delve into the definitional nuances of the concept. However, 
since each paper of this dissertation strives to understand policy-makers’ 
and experts’ alternative ways of thinking and framing of issues related to 
the expansion of expertise, I also rely on Irwin’s (2008, p. 584) definition of 
governance, which acknowledges this “cognitive dimension” as a relevant 
component of governance activity. According to Irwin, governance “…en-
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compasses the range of organizational mechanisms, operational assump-
tions, modes of thought, and consequential activities involved in governing 
a particular area of social action…” My own conception of modern govern-
ance thus includes the idea of public authorities interacting with increas-
ingly heterogeneous groups of experts and non-experts, and making deci-
sions in cognitively and institutionally fluid conditions.
2.2 Social driving forces
The process of expansion of expertise can be viewed from two opposite per-
spectives. One perspective sees it as a spontaneous social process, in which 
the social context of research and policy is transformed via the interactions 
of increasingly knowledge-based and reflexive actors. The second regards it 
in terms of policy strategies and exercises that are based on the intentional 
and directed expansion of expertise.17 An example of a linkage between the 
two dimensions at the most general level is the claim by Nowotny, et al. 
(2002, p. 12) that a social system can respond to the increasing complexity 
of its environment by increasing its internal complexity and thus the po-
tential for interacting with the environment. 
The driving forces of the expansion of expertise, i.e., the causes of the 
general transformation of the societal context of S&T, are only anecdotally 
treated in the papers of this dissertation. Instead, the focus is on the study 
of the institutional and strategic conditions and implications of that proc-
ess in specific policy arenas. In Paper IV, however, my co-authors and I dis-
cuss the driving forces by using the thesis of “Mode 2” knowledge produc-
tion from Gibbons, et al. (2000). A major premise in their argument is that 
the large investment in general university education by many countries 
over the last three decades is one of the main explanations for the radical 
increase in the supply of competent knowledge producers for organizations 
outside the academic system. This has taken place at the same time as the 
significance of scientific knowledge for both societal and industrial devel-
opment has grown exponentially (see Delanty 2001).
In addition to Gibbons, et al. (2000), many other social theorists have an-
alysed the driving forces of the same social change by paying particular at-
tention to the role of S&T in the process. The theory of reflexive modernisa-
tion (Beck 2000; Giddens 1990) is one of the main sociological accounts of 
the transformations of modern society. That theory is used here as a way 
of completing the limited analysis of the driving forces of the expansion of 
expertise; it is a commonly used explanation for the crises of rationalistic 
and expert-based decision-making in S&T. 
According to Beck (2000), reflexive modernization is a process contain-
ing two stages. In the first stage, there is an “automatic” transition from in-
dustrial to risk society, where risks are produced as part of the processes of 
2  Expanding expertise: theoretical issues and problems
mikk rask Expansion of Expertise.indd   25 3.6.2008   17:31:08
Rask – Expansion of Expertise in the Governance of Science and Technology26
modernization but are not yet the subject of sustained public or political 
conflict. In the second stage, the industrial society raises a growing realiza-
tion of the dangers involved, which then calls into question the health of 
the structures of society (see also, Lupton 1999, p. 66-67). Giddens (1990, p. 
36-37) characterizes reflexivity as a defining feature of all human action, in-
volving the continual monitoring of actions and their contexts. In the mod-
ern society, this implies the weighing up and critical assessment of institu-
tions and claim-makers, including those who speak with the voices of the 
“expert” (see also, Lupton 1999, p. 72-77).
Jaeger, et al. (2001) complete the picture of the process of reflexivity. 
They argue, referring to Scott (1995), that the evolution of organizational 
theory has been “from perceiving organizations as monolithic entities 
with fixed goals, rules, and borders, to perceiving them as reflexive bodies 
that observe the performance of other organizations and learn to adjust to 
changing social conditions.” Modern organization theory, in other words, 
has acknowledged organizations as self-reflective entities that even build 
special agencies to collect, process and integrate social feedback as a means 
of redirecting their own behaviour. The point, as Jaeger, et al., (2001, p. 279) 
put it, is that:
 . . . predictions about outcomes have become so uncertain that purely in-
ternal deliberations about future actions are unlikely to lead to reason-
able decisions. To make decisions feasible, then, institutions define their 
tasks in accordance with how they are perceived by the outside world. 
They generate options in a trial and error process and assess outcomes 
by pre-testing for social acceptance. At each stage of decision-making, in-
stitutions reflect about their goals and strategies by looking at their per-
formance through the lenses of outside observers.
Self-reflexivity, in other words, is required of any organisation in order 
to raise the quality of decision-making.
Following the diagnoses of the self-reflective process, one ends up with 
a complex picture of the dynamics of social action. The process of reflex-
ivity seems to drive societies toward a “game theoretical” condition,18 in 
which each actor monitors other actors, and actors base their actions on 
the expectations of other actors’ moves (and criticisms). While this diagno-
sis of the dynamics of social action can be one-sided, it points, however, to 
an important contextual underpinning of this dissertation. The demand for 
self-reflexivity increasingly drives science and technology policy agencies 
to adopt external viewpoints in their strategies. At the same time, however, 
they encounter the risk that their identities as agencies based on expertise 
are eroded. There is a built-in need, then, for those agencies to balance be-
tween the adaptation of external criteria and viewpoints and the assurance 
of their identity and traditional role.
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2.3 Emerging approaches based on the expansion of expertise
Thinking about how S&T policy institutions and agencies have responded 
to the social driving forces described above can be put to a historical per-
spective. To start with, the history of science and technology policy is not 
particularly long. Although there is a history of “passive” S&T policy before 
World War II19, many historically-oriented accounts take the post-war era to 
be the formative period for modern S&T policy in the Western context (see, 
e.g., Etzkowitz & Leyderdorff 2000; Gibbons, et al. 2000; Caracostas & Mul-
dur 1998; Allardt 1997; Freeman 1991). In the first decades of the post-war 
era, there was a tendency in the governance of S&T to believe in autono-
mous basic research and in large-scale military projects. From that point of 
view, the tendency to append additional social criteria and knowledge per-
spectives to the governance of S&T is a phenomenon of more recent times.
Increasing awareness of the risks and side-effects of new technologies 
has been one of the triggers to that process. Douglas (1985, p. 5), for exam-
ple, describes the emergence of risk perception research as follows: “The 
fears and conscience of Western industrial nations have been roused by nu-
clear radiation, chemical wastes, asbestos and lead poisoning. In response, 
an important new subdiscipline of the social sciences has emerged which 
addresses questions asked by industry and government about the public 
perception of risk.” The evolution of the expansion of expertise in the gov-
ernance context of S&T can be sketched through the institutionalization 
of three fields: risk analysis, technology assessment and the “participatory 
approach.”
McDaniels and Small (2004, p. 3-7) characterize risk analysis not as a dis-
tinct branch of science, but as a “hybrid discipline,” in which the current 
state of scientific and technological knowledge is made accessible to soci-
ety as input to risk management decisions. The “prehistory” of risk analy-
sis can be located in various contexts, such as early developments in proba-
bility theory, medicine, environmental health, chemical toxicology, reliabil-
ity analysis, health and safety regulation, and so on. Many accounts of the 
history of risk analysis, however, identify the 1970s as the starting point of 
professionalization and formal risk analysis. Golding (1992), for example, in 
his analysis of the history of risk research in the U.S.A., identifies the new 
legislation of the early 1970s, concurrent as it was with the establishment 
of federal bodies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as be-
ing formative for the rise of risk analysis. In the following decades, accord-
ing to McDaniels and Small (2004, p. 5), “. . . the continued growth of re-
search and applications addressing issues in risk analysis, and their exten-
sion to include a broad spectrum of scientific, social, and political perspec-
tives. . .” has led to an “interdisciplinary evolution” of the field.
Current thinking within the field of risk analysis also underlines the im-
portance of broad-based deliberations as an additional element to techni-
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cal expertise. Stern and Fineberg’s (2000, p. 24-25) argumentation is illustra-
tive of this position:
 Reliable technical and scientific input is essential to making sound deci-
sions about risk. Scientific and technical experts bring indispensable sub-
stantive knowledge, methodological skills, experience, and judgement to 
the task of understanding risk. . . But science is not necessarily neutral and 
objective in its ways of framing problems . . . Risk decisions are ultimately 
public policy choices.
Stern and Fineberg’s (2000) conclusion is that good science is a neces-
sary but not sufficient basis for good risk characterization. Their view is 
that risk experts are needed, e.g., because many hazardous substances and 
activities have non-obvious and delayed effects that can be uncovered and 
quantified only with highly technical methods. Broad-based deliberation, 
on the other hand, is needed to help determine what kind of analysis a de-
cision requires; to include information from different sources; to determine 
when analysis is balanced; and to determine how to synthesize the results 
of analysis to make them useful to participants in the decision-making. 
Stern and Fineberg’s (2000) conclusion is typical of recent scholarly think-
ing in the field of risk analysis.
The beginning of the formal history of technology assessment (TA) is 
the year 1972, when the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was estab-
lished within the U.S. Congress. Despite the abolition of the OTA in 1995, 
the policy art called technology assessment is still practiced in a variety of 
places (see LaPorte 1997). The evolution of TA has often been described as a 
series of paradigmatic shifts, from a forecasting-oriented and reactive TA 
(analysing the social impacts of technologies, and identifying related pol-
icy options) to proactive, constructive and participatory forms of TA (for the 
paradigms of TA, see, e.g., Eijndhoven 1997; Cronberg 1996; Rip, et al. 1995). 
Participatory technology assessment (pTA) refers, according to Joss and Bel-
lucci (2002a), to the methods and procedures of assessing socio-technolog-
ical issues that actively involve various kinds of social actors, assessors and 
discussants. They see the beginning of pTA as being in the late 1980s, with 
the experimentation that occurred in a few countries, most notably Den-
mark. The Danish Board of Technology held so-called “consensus confer-
ences,” which involved citizens in the centre of the assessment process. In 
the Netherlands, so-called “constructive TA” was developed by academics 
together with industry for the purpose of rendering the process of technol-
ogy development more responsive to the needs of potential users through 
interactive assessment procedures. Since the early 1990s, pTA has become 
widely established (see Joss & Bellucci 2002b; Rip, et al. 1995). 
If the participatory component in TA has been strengthened during the 
1980s and 1990s, there is a longer history of the “participatory approach” 
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as a mode of policy analysis and policy-making. Participation, according 
to Geurts and Mayer (1996, p. 26-27), both in the public and private sector, 
reached a temporary peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s as part of an 
overall movement in Western societies towards further democratisation 
(see also, Glenn 2003; Jamison 1999b, p. 2-5). Many approaches and mod-
els that are relevant for participation stem from this period. An example is 
the concept of the “participation ladder” that distinguishes several modes 
of participation in policy development, and attaches them to the different 
phases of the policy cycle.20 The interest in the participatory style of policy, 
according to Geurts and Mayer (op. cit.), has not, however, been steady, but 
cyclical. They claim that after the mid-1970s, participation became less pop-
ular due to temporary support for hierarchic and authoritarian models of 
policy development. They also hypothesize that in the late 1980s participa-
tion emerged again as a new dominant policy image, but with a pragmatic 
motivation, if compared to the ideological motivation of the preceding par-
ticipation phase.
Parallel storylines of the emergence of research fields based on “integra-
tive” research and problem-solving could be told of many other approaches. 
Examples of such approaches established during recent years are transdis-
ciplinary research21 (Bruun, et al. 2005; Nowotny, et al. 2002), futures studies 
(Bell 1997a, b), integrated assessment (Rotmans 2001) and foresight (Martin 
1996). There are also several theoretical approaches that have proceeded to-
ward more practical considerations and applications. The diagnosis by Gib-
bons, et al. (2000) of  “Mode 2,” for example, has been followed by the vi-
sion of Nowotny, et al. (2002) of an “Agora,” as a place for the making of so-
cially-robust knowledge. The ”post-normal science” approach (Ravetz 1999; 
Funtowicz & Ravetz 1990) has resulted in the development of practical tools 
for uncertainty assessment and communication (Petersen, et al. 2003). Hab-
ermas’ (1998; 1997) theory of communicative action has been applied both 
in the design and the evaluation of participatory models of environmental 
discourse (Renn, et al. 1995b), and so forth.
It is not an aim of this dissertation to review all approaches of policy 
and research based on the ideas of increasing participation and integration 
of heterogeneous knowledge perspectives. Notwithstanding that qualifica-
tion, there are enough approaches to claim that the expansion of expertise 
is not only a tendency in the social environment of S&T, but that it is also 
gaining terrain in the core work of strategy and governance.
Recently the development of new approaches has been accelerated by 
high-level policy proposals. Recommendations for more inclusive forms of 
governance have been made, for example, by the European Commission (EC 
2002b, 2001), the OECD (2001), the International Risk Governance Council 
(Renn 2005) and, in Finland, by an international evaluation panel of public 
administration (Bouckaert, et al. 2000).
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2.4 Rationales for the expansion of expertise as a policy strategy
 Since this context of science (i.e., Post-Normal Science) is one involving 
policy, we might see this extension of peer communities as analogous to 
earlier extension of franchise in other fields, as allowing workers to form 
trade unions and women to vote. In all such cases, there were prophecies 
of doom which were not realised. (Ravetz 1999, p. 651) 
Despite some problematic tendencies with the expansion of expertise 
(which we will review in Section 2.5), it is highly esteemed as a strategic ap-
proach. Ravetz (1999), for example, has suggested using the expression “ex-
tended peer communities” as a way to guarantee the quality and safety of 
scientific research under the condition of what he calls “Post-Normal Sci-
ence.” Post-normal science refers to issue-driven science, in which, typically, 
“facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high, and decisions urgent” 
(Ravetz 1999, p. 649) . Genetically modified foodstuffs are a paradigmatic 
example of an issue of environmental debate that relates to such science 
(op. cit., p. 647). The best way to meet the problems generated by post-nor-
mal science, according to Ravetz, is through the establishment of “extended 
peer communities” that consist not only of stakeholders with some form of 
institutional affiliation, but of “all those with a desire to participate in the 
resolution of the issue” (op. cit., p. 651). Ravetz acknowledges the risk that 
implementing the regulatory and evaluative function of the extended peer 
communities will dilute the authority of science; he takes it as the price, 
however, for assuring the quality of science.
In addition to Ravetz, several other authors have argued for the neces-
sity of the expansion of expertise as a strategic approach for policy. The ra-
tionales22 for the expansion of expertise, especially for increasing participa-
tion in policy-making, can be divided into two broad lines of argument (for 
the rationales see, e.g., Bellucci, et al. 2002; OECD 2001; Klijn & Koppenjan 
2000; Joss & Durant 1995; Fiorino 1990). The pragmatic argument considers 
wider participation as a way to improve and facilitate decision-making by, 
for example, making decisions more informed and socially acceptable. The 
normative argument stresses the intended function of rendering the proc-
ess of decision-making democratic (see Bellucci, et al. 2002). 
There are also alternative classifications of the rationales in the context 
of risk decisions, such as Fiorino’s (1990), who identifies three compelling 
rationales for broad participation. First, the “normative rationale” derives 
from the principle that government should obtain the consent of the gov-
erned; a related principle is that citizens have the right (embodied in laws) 
to participate meaningfully in public decision-making and to be informed 
about the bases for government decisions. Second, the “substantive ration-
ale,” according to Fiorino (1990), holds that relevant wisdom is not limited 
to scientific specialists and public officials, and that the participation by 
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various groups and individuals will provide essential information about a 
risk situation. Third, the “instrumental rationale” maintains that broad pub-
lic participation can decrease conflict and increase acceptance of and trust 
in decisions made by public agencies (Fiorino 1990). Considering the con-
tents of Fiorino’s substantive and instrumental rationales (i.e., information 
& social acceptance), they can be seen as overlapping with the category of 
pragmatic arguments, as found in Bellucci, et al. (2002). Fiorino’s  (1990) cat-
egory of normative arguments is equivalent to the similar one in Bellucci, 
et al., (2002). 
The pragmatic and normative rationales can be weighted differently in 
the different arenas of technical decision-making. Quite often, however, 
both rationales are referred to and considered as the complementary bene-
fits of the participatory approach. Ravetz (1999), for example, despite his as-
cribing a “Promethean” role to the extended peer communities as the car-
riers of democracy in the domain of technical decision-making, claims that 
broader democratic participation is only one component of quality in sci-
ence and policy (see also, Funtowicz & Ravetz 1990).
In addition to the compelling rationales for expanding expertise, policy-
makers also face conflicting quality criteria, such as the need for technical 
and economic rationality, and the necessity for ensuring the accountability 
and responsibility of decision-making agencies (see Renn, et al. 1995a, p. 361). 
Trade-offs23 between the different criteria are necessary since all criteria can 
be supported by pragmatic and normative arguments, but the latter criteria 
can be in conflict with the demands for participatory policy-making. 
2.5 Are there limitations to the expansion of expertise?
 The problem can be stated quite simply: Should the political legitimacy of 
technical decisions in the public domain be maximized by referring them 
to the widest democratic processes, or should such decisions be based on 
the best expert advice? The first choice risks technological paralysis: the 
second invites popular opposition.  (Collins & Evans 2002, p. 235-236)
Collins and Evans (2002) note that the definition of the limits of what they 
call the “extension of expertise” is perhaps not today’s practical problem 
but, with no clear limits to the widening of the base of decision-making, it 
might be tomorrow’s. They argue that science studies has tried to resolve 
the legitimacy problem of modern science and technology by showing that 
“the basis of technical decision-making can and should be widened be-
yond the core of certified experts . . .” (Collins & Evans 2002, p. 237), but have 
failed to show the limits of that process (a failure that they call the “Prob-
lem of Extension”). Collins and Evans claim that attachment of the widest 
democratic process to technical decision-making results in technological 
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paralysis. They think that the commitment of technical decision-making to 
irrelevant issues and concerns creates unnecessary hindrances in the way 
of technical development projects.
Parallel to the rationales for the expansion of expertise, the limitations 
to that process can be classified in two broad categories of arguments. The 
claim by Collins and Evans (2002) that the expansion of expertise can lead 
to technological paralysis is a pragmatic argument. It refers to the decreas-
ing productivity and efficiency of technical decision-making due to the in-
clusion of public concerns.24 Another similar argument is Renn’s (2005, p. 
50) assertion that an increasing number of actors and viewpoints makes 
it difficult to reach either a consensus or any kind of joint agreement. Rip’s 
(2001) notion of the “intra-murality trap” refers as well to the general dif-
ficulty of organised participatory exercises in providing productive results 
by, to paraphrase Rip (2004, p. 425), “capturing the variety out there, and 
getting the main contenders together and interacting.”
The normative arguments for the limitation of the expansion of exper-
tise do not refer to the negative consequences of decision-making, but to 
the negative quality of the decision-making process itself. Henkel and Stir-
rat (2002, p. 183), for example, claim that participatory practices tend to feed 
irresponsibility in decision-making by shifting the responsibility for the 
consequences of the projects from the agencies onto the people participat-
ing. To argue that accountability for the outcomes of decision-making is an 
attribute of representative democracy (see, e.g., Renn, et al. 1995b, p. 361) is 
for Henkel and Stirrat (2002) a way of claiming that increasing participa-
tion is harmful to democracy. An additional normative argument, not ex-
plicitly for the limitation of the expansion of expertise, but for prudence in 
organising such activities, is the notion that the time and effort of the par-
ticipating actors be appreciated as sparse resources that have to be treated 
with care and respect (Renn 2005, p. 51).
More arguments for the necessity of limiting the expansion of expertise 
can be drawn from critical studies of the participatory approach. Daele, et 
al. (1997, p. 97-98), for example, list several flaws of participatory exercises, 
based on a case study of a large-scale participatory technology assessment 
(pTA) in Germany. They argue that in their case study, pTA involved neither 
new knowledge nor democratisation, nor did it help resolve conflicts, but 
tended instead to “rationalize” the deliberation and restore the credibility 
of the experts. Fundamental problems are also identified by Kothari (2002, 
p. 152), who argues that participatory approaches tend to simplify compli-
cated social relations and conceal and even reify inequalities by construct-
ing dichotomies of power and oppositional social grouping. Renn (2004, p. 
310-315) has also examined critical claims concerning deliberative forms of 
democracy, including, e.g., suspicions about the ignorance and incompe-
tence of the participants and about regulatory imprecision, as well as con-
cern that deliberation becomes a new source of conflict.
mikk rask Expansion of Expertise.indd   32 3.6.2008   17:31:09
33
None of the diagnosed flaws of the participatory approach justify the 
conclusion that it should be rejected. A more appropriate interpretation is 
that the quality of the related processes should be improved. I believe we 
are on the way to scientifically developing such processes and, within cer-
tain limits, there is much room for making improvement.
2.6 Normative theories of the expansion of expertise
In order to tackle the problems resulting from unlimited expansion of ex-
pertise, Collins and Evans (2002) sketch an outline of a “Normative Theory 
of Expertise” (NTE). The purpose of their theorizing is to facilitate the study 
and consideration of legitimate roles for expertise in technical decision-
making. 
The NTE is based on a series of conceptual distinctions. First, Collins and 
Evans (2002, p. 245) distinguish expertise from political rights in decision-
making; they give examples such as Lysenkoism25, which they cite to re-
mind us of the threat that scientific research can be subverted by “big-Poli-
tics.” Second, the authors suggest new categories of expertise, including the 
following: contributory expertise (the capability to contribute to scientific 
research), interactional expertise (the capability to interact between scien-
tists and other actors), and referred expertise (the capability to understand 
a scientist’s contribution to a discipline). 
The third conceptual distinction relates to different types of science 
(Collins & Evans 2002, p. 267-269): normal science refers to cases where “. . . 
there are no major disputes, and the science is as settled as it ever can be.” 
In that case, scientists have an unproblematic role as consultants to deci-
sion-making. Golem science is “. . . science which has the potential to be-
come normal science, but has not yet reached closure to the satisfaction 
of the core-set.” An example of a question belonging to Golem science is 
whether the stomach linings of rats are affected by certain kinds of geneti-
cally modified potatoes. Historical sciences are those “. . . in which it is not 
to be expected that there will be any closure in the core-set debate in the 
foreseeable future.” The reason for the improbable consensus in historical 
sciences is that they deal with unique historical trends, the modelling of 
which is too complicated to be done accurately. An example of such science 
is the study of the ecological effects of genetically modified organisms. The 
term reflexive historical sciences refers to historical sciences in which “. . . 
the potential for uncertainty becomes even greater as the long-term out-
comes are affected by the actions of humans themselves.” An example is 
the science of global warming, in which input variables include political 
and ethical debates.
In applying the concepts they introduce, Collins and Evans analyze some 
classic case studies, e.g., Wynne’s study of Umbrian sheep farmers (Wynne 
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2000), and generate some theses and interpretations of the legitimate roles 
of expertise in different decision situations. In general, they claim that one 
of the major problems in the past has been the exaggeration of the impor-
tance of referred expertise of the wider community of scientists, in other 
words, attributing authority to scientists to speak on subjects outside their 
specialization (op. cit., 259). They highlight the potentially high value of 
interactional expertise in risk conflicts: in the case of the Umbrian Sheep 
farmers, for example, they consider that scientists should have had inter-
actional expertise in order to absorb the expertise of the farmers (op. cit., 
p. 256). Collins and Evans also claim that different types of science are con-
nected with different processes of decision-making. In the case of Golem 
science, they state that the scientific “core-set” will eventually reach a con-
sensus and, for that reason, technical decisions should be made by special-
ists. In the case of historical sciences, there is no hope that any major in-
crease in scientific input will reach certainty. For that reason, “. . . society 
needs certified and experience-based expertise in the scientific fields be-
longing to the problem, as well as political input” (op. cit., p. 269). With his-
torical science, there is also room for permanent institutions that are de-
signed to meld the expert and the inexpert. In the case of reflexive histori-
cal science, they think that there is no hope of “certainty” without social 
or cultural regulation. They suggest that, in addition to permanent institu-
tions for the regulation of science, new kinds of social institutions for the 
regulation of social life can be required. Their success requires the neces-
sary participation of the lay public (op. cit., p. 269).
Most commentators of the article by Collins and Evans appear to agree 
with the point of striving for a normative theory of expertise (Jasanoff 
2003; Lynch 2003; Rip 2003; Wynne 2003; Gorman 2002). What the com-
mentators criticize, however, is the “politically alienated” way in which the 
theory has been formulated, and the discontinuous way that the new re-
search agenda is presented with regard to earlier research in Science Stud-
ies. The criticism, as far as it concerns the validity of the theory, can be 
summarized in the following allegations: 1) NTE introduces a de-contextu-
alized treatment of expertise and lacks the specificity needed in the recog-
nition of relevant expertise (Rip 2003); 2) NTE implies a narrow and propo-
sitional framing of the issues of science and technology (Wynne 2003); 3) 
NTE introduces conceptual boundary problems, especially with the concept 
of  the “core set” (Wynne 2003); and 4) NTE suggests a theoretical solution 
to problems that can best be solved via political interventions (by social sci-
entists) (Rip 2003).26
In the field of risk analysis, there has recently been another attempt, in 
striking affinity to Collins and Evans’s proposal for the NTE, to create a nor-
mative theory for the selection of relevant expertise. The model, called Risk 
Management Escalator, or RME (see Renn 2005, p. 49-54, 2004), is based on 
a distinction between four types of risk problems, each connected to dif-
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ferent types of actors and management strategies. Simple risk problems are 
considered to be best solved through an “instrumental discourse” among 
risk management specialists (agency staff), and possibly with the directly 
affected groups. Complex27 risk problems are connected to an “epistemologi-
cal discourse” among agency staff and external experts representing differ-
ent science camps. The incorporation of public concerns and perceptions is 
not considered useful in the resolution of (cognitively) complex problems 
(Renn 2004, p. 298). Risk problems due to uncertainty call for a “reflective dis-
course,” with a focus on the balancing between over- and under-protection. 
When uncertainty is the key issue, the input of the risk specialists has to be 
supplemented by the inclusion of stakeholder concerns, economic budget-
ing and social evaluations. Finally, risk problems due to ambiguity require 
a “participative discourse,” i.e., an arena where conflicting arguments are 
openly discussed. High levels of ambiguity, according to Renn (2005, p. 52), 
require the most inclusive strategy for participation, due to the broad range 
of issues. An example is the debate on genetically modified food: it involves 
concerns about, e.g., the loss of personal agency when selecting and prepar-
ing food, the long-term impacts of industrialized agriculture, trust in reg-
ulatory institutions and the moral implications of tampering with nature 
(see also, Hampel, et al. 2000; Levidow 1999b). Ambiguous issues, in other 
words, open the debate about what problems are actually raised.
The overlap between the NTE and RME models is remarkable, consider-
ing that they have been created independently of each other (the authors 
do not refer to each others’ works), and in different academic contexts (the 
NTE in the field of science studies, the RME in the field of risk studies). The 
most conspicuous similarity between the two models is the assumption of 
four types of sciences/risks, considered as being the basis for suggestions of 
legitimate roles for expertise in technical decision-making. Perhaps because 
of the different backgrounds, though, the two models also diverge. In addi-
tion to differences in the categories applied, the models differ in their ori-
entation. For Collins and Evans, the effort to build the NTE is driven by an 
academic problem: to find a clear rationale for the expansion of expertise 
(Collins & Evans 2002, p. 237). For Renn (2005, p. 54; Renn 2004), the purpose 
of the RME scheme is practically-oriented: to provide theoretically and ethi-
cally supported guidelines for a design discourse that aims at selecting the 
appropriate risk assessment policy, defining priorities in risk handling and 
organizing the appropriate involvement procedures.
In the review of the debate on the NTE, it was already noted that sev-
eral commentators criticize the theory for its inflexibility and even “curi-
ously decontextualized” treatment of expertise (Rip 2003, p. 420). Van As-
selt (2005) raises a similar concern with regard to the RME, by arguing that 
the linking of risk characteristics (complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity) 
to specific forms of discourse and strategy is too rigid.28 By focusing on the 
types of science (NTE), or characteristics of risk (RME), normative theories 
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of expertise can suggest which experts (or non-experts) should partake 
of in different types of technical decisions. They cannot, however, explain 
why the suggested forms of participation in some contexts succeed and in 
other contexts meet resistance or even fail. My claim is that more attention 
is needed on the implications of the characteristics of different policy are-
nas on the way in which the new practices can be implemented. This is the 
task of the study of the “arena effects,” to which the latter part of this intro-
duction, after the presentation of the methodology, is devoted to.
2.7 Research questions
Since the expansion of expertise is an increasingly prevalent strategy in the 
governance of science and technology, and since there are both theoretical 
and practical reasons for identifying its limits, I think it is important to ex-
plore whether such limits can be identified in a more flexible and contex-
tually sensitive way than has been done thus far. For this purpose, I define 
my research questions (RQ) as follows: 
RQ 1  What are the characteristics of the policy arena that influence the 
expansion of expertise? 
RQ 2  How do the characteristics of different types of policy arenas—
causing an “arena effect”—influence the expansion of expertise?
RQ 3  Can better knowledge of the “arena effect” help design better strat-
egies based on the expansion of expertise?
The concept of “policy arena” is central to all these questions. It refers to 
the symbolic location of political actions that influence collective decisions 
or policies (see Renn 1992 and Paper II). Policy arenas are demarcated by 
the issues, not by geographical or organizational boundaries. The structure 
of the arena is defined and characterized by the institutional rules, and pat-
terns of interaction and resource mobilization by the actors involved. The 
concept of “arena effect” refers to the way in which the structural charac-
teristics of a policy arena affect the governance processes that take place 
in it. 
The research questions are answered in Section 4. In the next section 
(Section 3), the methods and materials of the case studies are explained.
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3  Methodology
Doing research on processes related to the expansion of expertise is largely 
an empirical and descriptive endeavour. Therefore, each paper in this dis-
sertation is based on original empirical research. Interviews are the pri-
mary source of the empirical material in Papers I, II and IV. The total 
number of interviews was 51, and they were carried out during 2002-2004. 
A large body of additional documentary material, consisting, for example, 
of media, policy and judicial documents, was analysed for Papers I and II. 
The primary empirical material for Paper III consisted of 16 benchmark re-
ports (varying between 20 and 50 pages) produced by foresight coordina-
tors in 15 European countries.29
Empirical study of the expansion of expertise is complex in nature. It 
involves interaction with various actors, such as policy-makers, business 
managers, scientific experts, stakeholders and critics. Each actor has his or 
her own interpretation of the processes that were studied. Therefore there 
are no a priori factors that would make a researcher’s interpretations more 
accurate than those of the other actors involved; rather, the researcher’s 
own position is subject to deconstruction. 
In order to secure an in-depth understanding of the studied phenomena 
and in order to increase the relevance and validity of the findings, I have 
followed two general methodological principles: triangulation (Mickwitz 
2006, p. 36-37; Denzin & Lincoln 2000; Taylor & Bogdan 1998, p. 80-82) and 
communicative validity (Silverman 2004; Tuunainen 2004, p. 47).
I have applied three kinds of triangulation: empirical, methodological 
and theoretical. Empirical triangulation is the application of manifold doc-
umentary materials for the study of the same phenomenon. For example, 
in Paper II, the analysis of the policy actors’ stated objectives in regard to 
Finnish forest biotechnology was based on two kinds of empirical material: 
24 interviews that were transcribed and coded, and the official statements 
from 62 organizations, including the actor groups represented by the inter-
viewees, in response to a proposal by the Ministry of Agriculture and For-
estry for a national gene technology strategy (MMM 2003). Methodological 
triangulation is the application of multiple research methods to the study 
of the same phenomenon. For example, in Paper III, the analysis of partic-
ipation in foresight was based on 16 benchmarking reports provided by 
European foresight coordinators. A qualitative content analysis of the re-
search material was first carried out co-operatively by an international task 
team that I was member of; I then conducted a formal content analysis of 
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the same material by using the ATLAS.ti programme.30 Theoretical triangu-
lation means the study of the same phenomenon or research problem from 
multiple theoretical perspectives. The “expansion of expertise” is a theoret-
ically postulated phenomenon about which only theoretical perspectives 
can be had. Exploring it both from the “downstream of expertise,” through 
the policy-focused lenses of the social arena theory in Paper II, and from 
the “upstream of expertise” through the research-focused lenses of Mode 2 
discourse in Paper IV, is an example of theoretical triangulation.
Communicative validity means the testing of the validity of the analy-
sis through a discourse with those investigated. I found it useful, for Papers 
I and II, to secure my understanding of the biotechnology-related issues 
with the researchers and policy-makers whom I interviewed. In regard to 
Paper III, I was fortunate to be engaged in an EU-funded ForSociety ERA-
Net project. This allowed me to receive feedback directly and through a for-
mal monitoring exercise31 from the foresight coordinators, as well as to dis-
cuss with social scientists and policy-makers the analysis and practice of 
foresight activities. As a methodological principle, communicative valid-
ity represents the idea of reflexive social science (Jaeger, et al. 2001, p. 279; 
Beck, et al. 1994): research can fruitfully explain social actions if the actors 
on whom the research is performed can comprehend its theoretical reason-
ing. The idea of reflexive social science is best exemplified by the research 
process leading to Paper IV. The interviews and discussions in which “Mode 
2” challenges in my own research environment were explored, served as a 
trigger for our laboratory researchers’ reflection on its current and future 
model of research education.
In addition to the general methodological principles, specific research 
methods have been applied in each case study. Papers I, II and III apply mul-
tiple methods for the analysis and evaluation of actor groups, issues and 
processes in different policy arenas. Paper IV is a discussion paper with less 
focus on the methodological aspects; even there however, systematic re-
search methods have been applied, including a literature review, interviews 
and formal evaluation criteria. Some new research methods have also been 
developed, particularly in Paper II, which refines and elaborates the method 
of the social arena analysis toward a method for risk pre-assessment. Paper 
III contributes to methodological understanding by studying the limits of 
the foresight method. 
The role of theory has been to contextualize, target and enrich the anal-
ysis. Different theoretical models have been applied in order to focus on 
specific aspects of the expansion of expertise. Thus, processes related to the 
expansion of expertise are studied from the perspective of policy styles and 
paradigms of participation in Paper I; from the perspective of “arena rules” 
and patterns of social resource mobilization in Paper II; from the perspec-
tive of trade-offs between different governance criteria in Paper III; and 
from the perspective of competing modes of research education in Paper IV. 
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The discussion on the expansion of expertise provides a synthesizing theo-
retical framework and perspective on the key issues of this dissertation.
The dissertation also elaborates theory in relation to other analytical 
frameworks and empirical case studies. The strategy in theory-building 
can be called “grounded generalism” (Hukkinen 2002a), as a search for ex-
planations for arena-specific processes. Theoretical concepts such as “clo-
sure by polarization,” in Paper II, and the “arena effect” (developed further 
in this introduction) are introduced as heuristic models. Their function is 
to identify and interpret empirical findings, and to help reflection on their 
origins and implications. Heuristic models do not aim at universal expla-
nations. This would not be feasible due to the idiosyncratic nature of the 
studied social processes. Heuristic models combined with empirical exam-
ples, however, can provide “real-life models” of ideas and lessons emerging 
from particular arenas. Such models can be helpful in analogical reasoning, 
as means for identifying kindred situations and utilizing lessons from past 
experience (see, e.g., Bruun & Toppinen 2004; Markman & Moreau 2001). 
Thus for example the findings concerning the arena of Finnish biotech-
nology policy can help us understand and generate ideas on how to deal 
with situations where either the “silence of the public,” or “polarization,” is 
among the issues. Similarly, the concept of the arena effect can orient our 
consideration toward the bearings of different types of arena upon the ex-
pansion of expertise.
Finally, the structure of this dissertation follows the form of an article 
dissertation. This structure has been chosen instead of the traditional mon-
ograph because it is increasingly the recommended way of writing doctoral 
dissertations in Finland. There is also another, more philosophical reason, 
relating to our discussion of “Mode 2” and to the processes of expansion of 
expertise that take place in the arena of research education. In Paper IV we 
propose article dissertations as a measure that supports a “smooth transi-
tion” toward Mode 2 research education. As we note in that paper, an arti-
cle dissertation guides a research student to publish in scientific publica-
tions during the writing of the dissertation (an especially relevant factor, 
if the funding of the student is based on projects in which articles are the 
expected outputs); it also effectively instructs the student of the practices 
of feedback and co-authoring. These are helpful skills in a Mode 2 type of 
environment, in which research performance is continuously measured, 
high quality contributions are expected, and science is becoming more and 
more international, accountable and collaborative. The downside of the ar-
ticle dissertation is that it involves multiple criteria of coherence32 instead 
of a single one. Each article, published in a scientific journal, is a coherent 
contribution to some specific research question and scholarly debate. It is 
therefore difficult to put together a set of such articles in a way that in-
volves neither overlapping nor discontinuous parts. This is a methodologi-
cal limitation that pertains to the structure of an article dissertation.
3  Methodology
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In the next section (Section 4) I explore ideas (and metaphors) related to 
the expansion of expertise and its “arena effects.” The main research ques-
tions of this dissertation are answered.
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4   Exploring the arena effects of  
the expansion of expertise
In Section 2 of this introduction, I presented two normative theories of ex-
pertise, the NTE and the RME. Both of them provide theoretically reasoned 
models for the identification and association of relevant experts and gov-
ernance approaches with different types of sciences and risks. While both 
approaches are instructive in providing general guidelines, they have been 
criticized for their rigidity and insensitivity to contextual variation.
Taking this criticism seriously, I claim that more attention should be 
paid to contextual and arena specific factors. This can be done through an 
empirically grounded analysis of the expansion of expertise.33 Such an anal-
ysis should focus on the main characteristics of policy arenas that influ-
ence the expansion process. I argue below that the different characteristics 
of the arenas favour different types of expertise, their expansion, conflicts 
and roles in decision-making. I call this the “arena effect.”
In principle, the arena characteristics that influence the expansion proc-
ess are innumerable. They consist of different configurations of actors, prac-
tices and institutional settings. From the perspective of the social arena 
theory and its view of the dynamics of arena processes (see Renn 1992 & 
Paper II), the characteristics can be divided into two main types: actor-in-
duced and institutional. When considering the different settings that the 
actor-induced characteristics imply for the process of the expansion of ex-
pertise, I suggest a distinction between two extremes, those of placid and 
polarized arenas. “Placid arena” refers to there being a low intensity of pub-
lic debate and a low level of mobilization by opposite social forces (in re-
gard to the issues of technical decision-making). “Polarized arena” in con-
trast refers to a high intensity of debate and a high level of mobilization by 
social forces in opposition to each other. As we will see next, the two differ-
ent types of arenas raise different issues and challenges for the expansion 
process.
Independent of the actor-induced characteristics, arenas can also be di-
vided into two main types based on their institutional profiles: hierarchic 
and participatory. If the established culture of policy-making is characteris-
tically elitist and centralized, and it favours exclusive processes in decision-
making and expert advice, arenas are hierarchic. Finnish science and tech-
nology policy, and biotechnology policy in particular, is an example of a hi-
erarchic arena (Kuitunen & Lähteenmäki-Smith Manuscript). Alternatively, 
if involvement of actors and knowledge perspectives that are external to 
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technically and professionally established elites is the starting point for de-
cision processes, then an arena can be called participatory. An example of 
such an arena in the context of policy advice is European foresight.34 In par-
allel with the distinction between placid and polarized arenas, also hierar-
chic and participatory arenas pose different issues and challenges for the 
expansion process.
The notion of “arena effect” may seem to be overly generalized. My 
point, however, is that within particular policy arenas we should begin to 
look at these effects more closely. Only through a sweeping study of arena 
effects can we learn what issues and problems they involve, what “consid-
eration sets” they open, and how the issues and problems can be responded 
to. (A synthesis of the empirical findings of the papers is presented in Fig-
ure 1 in Section 4.5.) In the following sections, I discuss each of the four 
arena characteristics. The discussion focuses on the following questions: 
What kinds of issues are related to the four arena characteristics? How 
do the issues affect the strategy of the expansion of expertise? What ap-
proaches are available for dealing with the issues? The aim is not to pro-
vide an exhaustive presentation of the issues that influence the strategy 
of the expansion of expertise. However, a synthetic view of the issues ena-
bles me to discuss whether the concept of the “arena effect” is useful, and 
whether a study of arena effects can help to discern topics that are relevant 
for strategic expansion of expertise.
4.1 Placid arenas
Placid arenas are characterized by a low intensity of public debate. There is 
also a low level of mobilization by opposite social forces, such as industrial 
organisations and the environmental NGOs that are critical of them. The 
issue of the “silence of the public” is among those that belong to a placid 
(or calm) policy arena. The relative “silence” of Finns in regard to the devel-
opment and introduction of gene technology was also my original inspira-
tion for beginning to do research on Finnish biotechnology policy. I found 
it peculiar that at the same time as a fierce public controversy about gene 
technology was raging in other parts of Europe, evidence of a similar pub-
lic debate in Finland was difficult to find. I also found it interesting that 
Finns seemed to approve of their public authorities and experts in spite of 
top-down biotechnology policy, when similar policies by their colleagues in 
many other countries had met with increasing distrust and criticism (see, 
e.g., Bauer & Gaskell 2002; Durant, et al. 1998).
The “silence of the public” is a relational concept and can be understood 
only through comparison with other contexts, in which the situation is 
more or less the opposite, i.e., where there is a high intensity of public de-
bate and, in the case of conflict, oppositional social forces are being mobi-
mikk rask Expansion of Expertise.indd   42 3.6.2008   17:31:09
43
lized. Indeed, a situation of conflict is generally thought of as a more inter-
esting object of research than one where it is absent. The former is easily 
seen as manifesting real problems, such as the question of fair allocation of 
risks and resources, whereas the latter does not seem to manifest problems 
at all.35 Despite the apparent lack of any problem perspective, however, the 
“silence of the public” issue raises some interesting questions: What kind of 
a state and signal is it actually? How can this signal be interpreted by pol-
icy-makers? How can they respond to it?
John Graham’s (2001) study, Technological danger without stigma: the 
case of automobile airbags, is among the few case studies that start from 
somewhat similar premises. Graham addresses the issue of how the posi-
tive public perception and absence of public outrage concerning automo-
bile airbags has influenced the related risk regulation. The author presents 
the following conclusion about the effects of the “silence of the public”: 
 Without heightened public concern about airbags, it is difficult to imag-
ine how the side effects of airbags will be minimized while the benefits of 
the technology are retained and enhanced. More lives may be lost unnec-
essarily if this technology does not become somewhat more stigmatized in 
the minds of the public.
Graham (2001) makes the argument that public outrage can be a neces-
sary condition for sound public policy.36 This is because a critical public ef-
fectively scrutinizes new technologies, which leads to stringent regulation 
of dangerous technologies.37 “Silence of the public,” according to Graham’s 
interpretation, is a dysfunctional state, because it allows and even supports 
the application and development of dangerous technologies. If what Gra-
ham found in the case of airbags points to the “silence of the public” as be-
ing a signal, it is worth asking whether policy-makers tend to interpret the 
signal as a tacit sign of the success of existing policies, or, instead, as an 
early warning of emerging (technological or institutional) problems.
Paper I, in which the cognitions of civil servants responsible for Finnish 
biotechnology are studied, answers some of those questions. Most of the 
civil servants interviewed interpret the “silence of the public” as a tacit sign 
of success in national biotechnology policy. Some of them support their be-
lief with evidence from the science and technology barometers (TTR 2001; 
EC 2000), which indicate positive perceptions by Finns about biotechnology 
and public R&D institutions. None of them refer to any problems that could 
be caused by the low intensity of public debate.
The positive interpretation by policy-makers of the silence of public de-
bate causes restrictions for the expansion of expertise; it does not encour-
age the policy-makers to shift public participation to the core of strategic 
thinking and action. There are at least two kinds of explanation for this. 
First, a “positive reading” involves a detachment from the issues of “cit-
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izenry.” If policy-makers have not been forced to devote their time and 
thinking to the issues of citizens’ participation, their ideas concerning the 
role of the citizenry in policy-making remain weak and ambiguous, as Pa-
per I indicates. An example is the contradictory argumentation by the two 
civil servants interviewed: one of them thinks that “…citizens’ opinions 
strongly affect policy-making and the focusing of the research financing,” 
whereas the other does “…not see that citizens’ concerns would have any in-
fluence on the activities” (see Paper I).38 A detached orientation to issues of 
participation involves a framing of the expansion of expertise as an exotic 
question of style rather than as a relevant strategic approach. Second, the 
economic and educational potentials underlying a placid arena (see, Paper 
I) maintains a “positive reading” of the status of public debate. This reading 
compromises the more critical and democratic ambitions of the expansion 
of expertise.
To summarize, a placid arena raises issues of the different values and 
functions of public debate and social scrutiny (which are, in this context, 
lacking elements). The silence of the arena can also prevent processes of 
policy renewal. For example, in the rare instance when the public authori-
ties in Finland aimed at a new opening for a structured public debate on 
biotechnology (viz., the “Hanasaari conference,” in Paper I), they ended up 
with traditional education of public in science. The case indicates that too 
much distance between policy-makers’ cognitions and the new way of act-
ing leads to counterproductive results. Considering the expansion of exper-
tise as a policy strategy, a placid arena raises the issue of how to motivate 
change, and of how to ensure that the new initiatives do not remain subor-
dinated to the predominant paradigms of policy-making.
4.2 Polarized arenas
Polarized arenas are characterized by a high intensity of debate and a high 
level of mobilization by social forces in opposition to each other. The proc-
ess of polarization begins with the manifestation of the conflicting goals 
(and there can be several of them) of the policy actors. In pursuit of their 
goals, actors mobilize heterogeneous means, including (conflicting) ev-
idence and (antagonistic) cultural values. As a result of the contextually-
contingent process of polarization, surprising configurations of actors and 
issues can emerge (such as industrial organisations and environmental 
NGOs co-building an anti-GM technology agenda). Polarization challenges 
existing ways of policy-making and increases the relevance of the expan-
sion of expertise as a strategic option. Since polarization can jeopardize ef-
fective decision-making, it raises the question of how policy-makers can 
find means for more effective action while still protecting a “rational” mode 
of action.
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In the beginning of 2003, when I started my orientation to the study of 
Finnish forest biotechnology, the landscape of the national biotechnology 
policy began to change dramatically. That was largely due to the accumu-
lating effects of a small but energetic NGO, the People’s Biosafety Associa-
tion (PBA). It was the first Finnish environmental NGO devoted to Finnish 
biotechnology issues. 
From its beginning in 2000, the PBA started to mobilize a continuous 
anti-GM campaign, with a special focus on GM trees. It arranged activities 
such as citizens’ petitions, legal action against public regulatory agencies 
and various media campaigns against gene technology—issues that had 
only been seen in other European countries. The scientific community re-
sponded to the critical claims not only by correcting unscientific claims 
in the public media, but also to some extent by mobilizing a pro-GM cam-
paign. An illustrative example is the case of genetically modified birch—the 
Finnish national tree under pressure. Professor Tuomas Sopanen, together 
with his group at the University of Joensuu, was awarded the Eco Founda-
tion’s Environmental Award 2004 for the development of non-flowering 
GM birches39; the same honour was interpreted contradictorily as both an 
act of irresponsibility and as an environmental assault by the opposing 
camps of experts and activists, respectively. The course of events led to an 
intensifying process of polarization. The conflict culminated in the destruc-
tion, by unknown saboteurs, of a GM tree field test site in Punkaharju in 
the summer of 2004.40 As documented in Paper II, this was the moment 
when the European controversy over biotechnology landed in Finland. 41
The particular characteristics of the polarization of the Finnish forest bi-
otechnology debate can be summarized as follows. First, the PBA effectively 
“filled a vacuum” in public debate. This contributed to a critical overtone in 
public discussion. Second, forest industries have become resistant to R&D 
activities linked with modern biotechnology. They have even contributed 
to an anti-GM campaign through their sustainability policies and forest 
certificates. Third, the number of driving forces in the arena of forest bio-
technology is small. The two dominant groups that are building a positive 
agenda for forest biotechnology are (forest) biotechnology scientists and 
public financiers. Since the Finnish research funding system favours fund-
ing co-operation between the public and private sectors, the withdrawal of 
the industrial partner from the usual “core-set” of R&D projects has caused 
severe funding problems for forest biotechnology researchers. The fund-
ing problem, combined with the low number of driving forces and the diffi-
culty of building socially acceptable regulation and research agendas, have 
resulted in a “paralysis” of the national forest biotechnology policy. Paper II 
calls this process “closure by polarization.”
Polarization challenges policy-making in various ways. Paper II makes 
the claim that the paralysis of the Finnish forest biotechnology policy proc-
ess is sub-optimal for most actors. Its continuation will undermine the for-
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est biotechnology research base, and suspend most direct routes towards 
applications. Nor are there signs that the paralysis would have stimulated 
investments in alternatives to forest gene technology, as required by the 
critics. 
The difficulties resulting from the “closure by polarization” are studied 
in Paper II from the perspective of social resource exchange by applying so-
cial arena theory and method (Jaeger, et al. 2001; Renn 1992). This involves 
a “rational actor” perspective on the study of the arena effects. Actors, ac-
cording to this theoretical assumption, are “rational” in the sense that they 
are presumed to be goal-oriented, and pursue their goals in the most effec-
tive manner by mobilizing such social resources that help them best attain 
their goals (see Jaeger, et al. 2001, p. 175-176). It is also hypothesized that a 
broad set of social resources is needed for influential action, and that rely-
ing on one or few resources involves an inflationary tendency. These hy-
potheses are supported by the empirical findings. The successful action 
of the environmental NGOs, for example, in regard to their objectives re-
lated to regulation, has been accompanied by their mobilization of the so-
cial resources on a broad scale. The less successful action by the key regula-
tory agency, the BGT (e.g. through the continued defeats in legal processes), 
has instead been accompanied by its reliance on a narrow set of social re-
sources, political authority and scientific evidence.
Regarding the patterns of social resource exchange and other particular-
ities of the policy process, Paper II generates options for more effective pol-
icy. One line of options regards different ways of explicating and refram-
ing prevailing knowledge perspectives and problem interpretations. The 
other line focuses on the composition of the actors and competences that 
are available in the policy arena.
Included in the first line of interventions is the suggestion that the key 
regulatory agencies identify and “blow up” dissonances, instead of pursu-
ing consensus-seeking and “neutral” balancing between the key actors and 
their different safety and marketing requirements. The identification of the 
dissonance is suggested as an amenable way toward conflict resolution (cf., 
Hukkinen, et al. 1990). Dissonances are covered over through ambiguous 
statements by actors and organisations; the dissonances can be found both 
among and between the actor groups. An example is the ambiguity of pub-
lic financiers on the issue of genetic modification of wood material. It is ar-
gued in Paper II that more coherent and well-articulated positions by the 
financiers would better allow deliberation on feasible lines of development. 
In addition to the discovery of dissonances, other intervention options are 
found in the open-endedness of the agenda-setting process. This allows a 
high potential for reaching a “closure by redefinition of the problem” (e.g., 
Pinch & Bijker 1999; Misa 1997). In other words, there can be untapped ways 
of framing the research needs in a way acceptable to most actors. An ex-
ample is the suggestion by some molecular biologists to develop “organic 
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GMOs” by focusing forest biotechnology research on the screening and fur-
ther development of genetic mutations within natural tree populations.42
The second line of intervention options focuses on the actors and avail-
able competences in the policy arena. Paper II suggests that since the 
number of the driving forces in Finnish forest biotechnology policy is lim-
ited, among the most critical issues is to involve additional actors and 
stakeholders. Since there are, however, different kinds of obstacles for 
some of the actors’ entering the arena, a study of the “entrance barriers” 
is needed for their closer inspection. Some of these barriers are studied in 
Paper II. In the case of the forest companies, for example, there is evidence 
of a trade-off needed between their value commitments and reputations. 
However, the problem they express with the lack of evidence for the eco-
nomic profitability of forest biotechnology investments could be solved, or 
at least mitigated, by commissioning an inquiry into the issue (see Paper 
II). Another example of the entrance barriers is the current way of organ-
izing public consultations e.g., through public hearings on GM field tests. 
Currently, consultations are loosely organized and lack a clear and influ-
ential connection to the decision process, and could in these respects be 
improved.
Paper II also generates other alternative means related to the expan-
sion of expertise. Examples include an idea of establishing an institute that 
gathers and cultivates the knowledge and competence related to the com-
mercialization and socio-economic issues of forest gene technology43; sug-
gestions for policy-makers to build up new competences in risk communi-
cation and trans-disciplinary issues, and finally, a general recommendation 
for the key regulatory agencies to switch toward a more open and partici-
patory style of policy-making. 
The preceding suggestions call for more inclusive processes and ex-
panded knowledge frameworks. This is not the only available direction, 
however. There are also characteristics in the arena that speak for an exclu-
sive rather than inclusive approach. First, many of the issues of Finnish for-
est biotechnology derive from its being in the early phase of the policy cy-
cle (e.g., Barkenbus 1998). Actors’ awareness of the options and risks of this 
technology is rising, but only gradually. Stabilization has taken place only 
on a few, if any, of the issues. Second, the debate on the future risks of for-
est biotechnology indicates that not just complexity, uncertainty and am-
biguity, but also a high degree of ignorance prevail (see, e.g., Asselt & Rot-
mans 2002). An example is the hazards of gene flow from a GM tree popu-
lation to a wild adjacent population. Most of the interviewees for Paper II 
acknowledge the risk, but they have failed to work out any examples of the 
hazard scenarios. These are features in the debate that call for better expert 
knowledge. In Paper II I propose that a platform for broader social debate 
and criticism could be built by commissioning a risk scenario exercise by 
a selected group of experts, such as forest tree breeders, population ecolo-
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gists and molecular biologists. More generally, considering the possibility 
of additional actors contributing to the policy process, it seems that the cre-
ation of a “forceful focus” (Rip 1986) would be a prerequisite. This requires a 
higher level of knowledge and an elaboration of some targeted issues. 
To recapitulate, the most remarkable aspect of the polarization of the 
arena of Finnish biotechnology policy is that it transforms the expansion of 
expertise from an issue of style into one of power and influence, and even 
of organisational survival. We have seen that both inclusive and exclusive 
approaches are needed to solve policy problems in a polarized arena. Con-
sidering the means that are available for increasing an actor’s influence in 
a policy process (e.g., wilful polarization of actors’ opinions and attitudes or 
politically biased framing of the problems), only some of them fit into the 
remit of public agencies. Therefore, whereas in the placid arenas balancing 
was needed between policy-thinking and action, in the polarized arena the 
need is for balancing between “rational” and influential action. 
4.3 Hierarchic arenas
The hierarchic policy arena, as policy arenas often are, is the place of an 
elitist, centralized and exclusive culture of expert advice and decision-mak-
ing. The hierarchic arena represents the enemy, the cultural contradiction 
of the expansion of expertise. Hierarchic arenas involve compromising and 
re-orienting arena effects that influence the expansion process. An extreme 
case is when the expansion process acquires the ritualistic and performa-
tive characteristics of “Quasi-Expansion” (see below).
Even hierarchic arenas have to be renewed, however, to better cope with 
the complexities of the societal context. The issue then becomes to find a 
balance between a reactive and a proactive approach to a renewal of pol-
icy culture. A reactive approach means waiting for the negative lessons to 
emerge, whereas a proactive approach means acting before problems or 
conflicts are culminated. The former approach may prove inadequate and 
costly, whereas the latter puts the identities of experts and agencies under 
strain. 
A possible reason for adopting a reactive rather than a proactive ap-
proach to policy renewal can be in what Collins and Evans (2002) call the 
“Problem of Extension,” i.e., the fear that wider democratic processes re-
sult in technological paralysis. The case studies in this dissertation suggest, 
however, that this fear is not necessarily substantiated. It seems that the 
“Problem of Extension” does not materialize in a hierarchic arena.
The Finnish case of biotechnology policy can be taken as an exam-
ple. Collins and Evans (2002) suggest that, in the first phase (of a series of 
events leading to the “Problem of Extension”), technical decision-makers 
meet increasing societal criticism, which actualizes the “Problem of Legit-
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imacy.” This is what has happened in the conflict about Finnish forest bi-
otechnology (Paper II). A key regulatory agency, operating under a model 
of “best expert advice,” drifts into a legitimatization crisis, due to various 
forms of social critique. In the second phase, according to the same authors, 
the extension of expertise is suggested as a remedy to the “Problem of Le-
gitimacy.” In the Finnish case, the remedy is prescribed by European Union 
regulation and its requirement to hold public hearings. In the third phase 
of the Collins and Evans’s model, the extension of expertise leads to techno-
logical paralysis. This view is also shared by Finnish researchers and civil 
servants whom I interviewed: EU regulation is perceived as a force that in-
duces paralysis in R&D activities. Deviating from the schema of Collins and 
Evans, however, new strategies based on the extension of expertise were 
not fully adopted in Finnish biotechnology policy. Despite efforts by na-
tional authorities to organise “structured public discussions” and regula-
tory public hearings, the results have been something akin to public educa-
tion of science and safeguarded rituals of public involvement, with no ac-
tual links to decision-making. As long as the building of new, democratic 
processes for biotechnology-related decision-making has been targeted, 
there has been a mismatch with the target (or at least a long delay with it), 
and financial and human resources have been wasted.44 This situation can 
be called the “Problem of Quasi-Expansion,” and it should be distinguished 
from Collins and Evans’s (2002) “Problem of Extension.”
Another possible reason for adopting a reactive approach to policy re-
newal can be found in the strength of policy cultural traditions. The expan-
sion of expertise implies increasingly complex processes of decision-mak-
ing and redefinitions of responsibilities, which can be seen as threats to the 
traditional way of policy-making and trust-building. In a benchmark study 
of European foresight exercises (see Klüver, et al. 2006b, and Paper III), we 
identified several cultural characteristics in different national contexts that 
are inimical to foresight as an open and participatory approach. Examples 
include tendencies of policy culture, such as scienticism (in Bulgaria), cor-
poratism (in Denmark), lack of a culture of collaboration (in Malta), and 
questioning of politically-independent actors within the policy system (in 
the Netherlands).
Whatever the particular tissue of a national political culture that ex-
plains the hierarchic characteristic of a policy arena, the arena involves 
an inimical orientation to the expansion of expertise. That orientation re-
sults, most notably, in a tendency toward “Quasi-Expansion” that can be de-
fined as noncommitment to the expansion of expertise. Quasi-Expansion 
seems to be a typical problem in the organising of participatory processes 
in a hierarchic arena. It manifests itself in under-investment of the social 
resources in the participatory process; in unfortunate compromises of in-
terest by the organisers; and finally, in the ambiguity and ineffectiveness of 
the expansion process.45
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Quite interestingly, “Quasi-Expansion” and the “Problem of Extension” 
are interlinked limitations to the expansion of expertise. Quasi-Expansion 
feeds disappointment in efforts to build wider democratic processes. It pre-
vents processes and conditions that contribute to the “Problem of Exten-
sion.” Thus, the Problem of Quasi-Expansion has to be resolved, at least to 
some extent,46 before one can start solving the Problem of Extension. The 
situation is analogous to organising field tests of GMOs: risks have to be 
taken in real-life conditions (by studying GMOs in natural ecosystem inter-
actions), in order to gain proper understanding of them (the environmental 
risks of the GMOs); the final test of the limits of the expansion of expertise 
is in the real-life context of decision-making. If Quasi-Expansion is a hazard 
mode of action, the strategy of the expansion of expertise is a risk mode.
Commitment to the expansion of expertise can be a tool for reforming 
a hierarchic policy arena in a proactive way. Foresight, for instance, is com-
monly conceived of as a tool for reforming a hierarchic, top-down or other-
wise rigorous culture of innovation policy into a more participatory, inter-
active and flexible one (Paper III). In a recent report on foresight (Klüver, et 
al. 2006b) we found that specifically in the EU’s entrant countries, such as 
Romania and Bulgaria, this is the main stimulus for policy-makers to intro-
duce the foresight practice. The functionality of foresight as a tool for re-
form of policy culture, however, depends on the activities in the broader in-
stitutional setting. In a monitoring exercise of the Klüver’s, et al., (2006a&b) 
reports, we found that the trend of increasing participation in foresight 
is most often associated with a more general shift in governmental ap-
proaches (see, Bedsted, et al. 2007, p. 12-19). This is the case, for example, 
in the Danish foresight programme, which is linked to the government’s 
globalization strategy, with the intention of broadening the basis for the 
strategic intelligence needed for the political prioritization of research pro-
grammes. This is also the situation in the UK. According to a UK respond-
ent in the monitoring exercise, “[t]he work of foresight should be consid-
ered alongside of the broader Government initiatives of which it forms a 
part.” In the UK these initiatives include the Government’s guidelines on 
scientific analysis in policy making,47 and a ten-year investment framework 
for science and innovation, enhancing a new mode of public engagement 
that builds on “upstream” dialogues to inform policy-making.48
A broader shift of national policy approaches toward the expansion of 
expertise can support foresight as a tool for policy cultural change. Devel-
opments in the broader institutional setting, however, raise issues of func-
tionality. Who or which institute should take the flagship role in the de-
velopment of a new participatory culture of policy-making? Could it be 
the responsibility of, for example, some ministerial agency that is apply-
ing the foresight practice? In many countries there are several governmen-
tal programmes and enabling mechanisms for undertaking such develop-
ment (examples are the UK Government’s Sciencewise programme,49 and 
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the Danish Board of Technology). It follows, as was expressed by a UK fore-
sight coordinator who was interviewed, that “…the understanding of partic-
ipation and a methodology that reflects this understanding is likely to rest 
in building capacity within and beyond foresight programmes.” The more 
prominent the role a policy agency takes in the battle for policy renewal, 
the more it puts its capacity and identity under strain.50
To conclude, hierarchic arenas tend to compromise the expansion of ex-
pertise, and involve a problem of “Quasi Expansion.” The problem of Quasi 
Expansion can be solved through a stronger commitment to the expansion 
of expertise. This may require, however, that a broader shift in policy cul-
ture takes place. Adopting a flagship role in such a process puts the iden-
tities of policy agencies under strain. This calls for agencies to balance be-
tween compliance with their traditional norms and their adoption of a 
proactive strategy. 
4.4 Participatory arenas
A participatory arena involves actors and knowledge perspectives exter-
nal to technically and professionally established elites in processes related 
to expert advice and decision-making. Metaphorically speaking, this is the 
home territory of the expansion of expertise. “Foresight” is an example of 
such an arena, since recent definitions of foresight take participation as one 
of its key components51 and extensive participation is generally recognized 
as its current trend (see, e.g., Salo, et al. 2004; Barré 2001). 
The participatory arena is the exception rather than the rule among the 
arenas of technical decision-making. Foresight, for example, has generally 
an indirect advisory function, rather than the direct function of decision-
making in the process of S&T policy.52 Since the expansion of expertise is 
a trend that modifies governance practices, however, we can expect partic-
ipatory arenas to become more general in the future. Therefore it is of a 
more general interest to explore what happens to the expansion process in 
a participatory arena. 
My empirical perspective on participatory arena is based on an EU-co-
ordinated benchmark study on “science-society dialogues” in foresight 
(Klüver, et al. 2006b). This is a narrow perspective, but still provides a view-
point on other kinds of limitations of the expansion process than those 
caused by a hostile policy culture. It is difficult to explain some of those 
limitations merely by referring to a policy-cultural resistance, since S&T 
policy of today favours foresight and its prevailing participatory approach.
A starting point of any foresight exercise is that it aims at “out-of-the-box 
thinking,” i.e., at generating thoughts that move away in diverging direc-
tions so as to involve a variety of visions that sometimes lead to new ideas, 
solutions and decisions. This is why a great variety of actors and knowledge 
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perspectives is generally welcomed in foresight. Another important starting 
point of foresight is that it aims to be relevant for public policy. The visions 
generated by foresight exercises have to be recontextualized in the realm 
of policy-making. This is difficult, however. There are internal limitations in 
the arena of foresight, which makes it problematic to combine a wide vari-
ety of actors and visions with productive processes of decision-making. 
That dilemma was partially reflected in our EU benchmark study on 
foresight (Klüver, et al. 2006a). We found that foresight coordinators gener-
ally appreciate the idea of wide-scale participation in foresight; they ration-
alize this by using both principled and pragmatic arguments (as discussed 
in Section 2). With regard to the high level of appreciation, though, we rec-
ognized that the real level of participation was low and the circle of actors 
narrow. The group of key actors consisted of high-level civil servants, re-
searchers and industrial partners. Because it was the duty of our task team 
in the EU-project to “enhance ‘science-society dialogues’ in foresight,” we 
ended up, quite philosophically, making recommendations to increase par-
ticipation (Klüver, et al. 2006a).
During the analysis of the benchmark material, however, my attention 
was attracted to the pragmatic difficulty of organizing foresight exercises 
in a way that allows for extensive involvement and widespread social de-
bates. There were many lessons garnered from the foresight coordinators 
we studied, which illuminates the pragmatic aspects of expanding exper-
tise in foresight. While many of those lessons were reports of failures and 
difficulties, there were also examples of successes. Since wide empirical 
material was available—an effort to build a database that allows a compar-
ative case study between 15 countries!—and our task team had analyzed it 
only from a rather general and policy-oriented standpoint, I decided carry 
on with the analysis of the same material. I focused on the issues of “requi-
site variety”. The findings are reported in Paper III. 
Paper III studies the dilemma that emerges in foresight when combin-
ing high requisite variety with productive convergence. The concept of 
“requisite variety” refers to the degree to which the heterogeneity of the 
outside world is captured in the setup of a “hybrid forum,” such as fore-
sight (see Rip, et al. 2004, and Paper III). Requisite variety provides cognitive 
representation and variation. Requisite variety can be increased by increas-
ing the number and heterogeneity of participating actors and through the 
open and exploratory design of the foresight process. Productive conver-
gence transforms requisite variety into different products, such as well-ar-
ticulated and robust decisions and innovations. Productive convergence can 
take place either through the formal design of the foresight process (e.g., by 
assigning a pre-defined role to foresight in a public policy process, such as 
defining the priority research areas in a national research policy strategy), 
or more likely, through various informal channels (e.g., participants spread 
the foresight visions in their home organizations).
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Paper III indicates that there are two kinds of difficulties in combining a 
high requisite variety with productive convergence. One relates to increas-
ing complexity and managerial difficulty as the structure of actors in fore-
sight becomes more heterogeneous. Several examples, such as the Czech, 
Maltese, Norwegian and UK national foresights, provide lessons about the 
rising costs, strategizing and cognitive distance that can damage the orga-
nizing of a foresight process in an effective and efficient way (see Paper III). 
This type of difficulty for foresight is called the “involvement—instrumen-
tality trade-off,” according to Renn’s (2006) similar hypothesis. Another 
kind of difficulty relates to the creational and motivational aspect of fore-
sight. The participation of (politically) influential persons can be required 
for transforming the foresight outputs into practical outcomes (see e.g., the 
examples of the Czech, Danish, Norwegian and UK cases in Paper III). When 
such persons are being involved, however, they often influence the fore-
sight process through their a priori strong visions and commitments and 
thus reduce the open, exploratory and surprise-seeking focus of foresight. 
This type of difficulty is called the creativity-stakeholding trade-off, accord-
ing to Georghiou and Keenan’s (2006) similar hypothesis.
Paper III argues that a trade-off between increasing requisite variety 
and productive convergence is to some extent inevitable. The experiences 
of foresight coordinators, however, provide lessons in how the two desir-
able but incompatible aspects of foresight can to a certain extent be recon-
ciled. Several methodological solutions and examples are listed in the pa-
per. The contextually contingent nature of the solutions is discussed. For 
example, the success of a Dutch “Ocean Farming” foresight in combining 
high requisite variety with productive outcomes is explained by consider-
ing both its methodological and contextual aspects. Examples of the suc-
cessful methodological aspects are that the politically-complex issue (of an 
increased but sustainable use of the North Sea) allowed a “natural” inclu-
sion of a broad range of dimensions, such as governance, market develop-
ment and consumer preferences; and that the provision of a high level of 
independence and responsibility to a large number of participating stake-
holders in the field of ocean farming instilled them with a high level of mo-
tivation. Equally important, however, is that the dialogue was deeply in-
tegrated with the Dutch corporatist approach to policy, which is even en-
forced in Dutch law (Paper III).
Paper III also raises the issue that the trade-off between variety and con-
vergence is not limited only to organized formal exercises in the way that 
foresight is. There is evidence that a similar dilemma pertains to various 
kinds of group learning processes (Rip, et al. 2004; Rip 2003; Nair 2001; Noot-
eboom 1999; see, e.g., March 1991). We can even expect it to become a sys-
temic issue. In Finland, for example, more than 300 foresight exercises were 
carried out between 1998 and 2003 by organisations belonging to the “Na-
tional System of Innovation” (see Klüver, et al. 2006b). While this is a prom-
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inent example of the process of expansion of expertise, it indicates that 
there also can be a saturation point at a systemic level. There is the risk that 
the numerous foresights will result in overlapping and unexploited visions.
To conclude, even in a participatory arena there are limitations to the 
expansion process. The trade-off between variety and convergence implies 
that involvement at some stage becomes costly and counterproductive. This 
indicates that what Collins and Evans (2002) called the “Problem of Exten-
sion” (i.e., the decreasing productivity and efficiency of technical decision-
making due to the inclusion of public concerns) can become materialized in 
a participatory arena. The “Problem of Extension,” however, is not as mono-
lithic as Collins and Evans’s notion of “technological paralysis” might sug-
gest. There are at least two different types of variety-convergence trade-off 
with different reasons. By learning and evaluating past experience one can 
attempt to expand those limits.53
4.5 Implications
This dissertation explores how and on what conditions the expansion of 
expertise takes place in different arenas of technical decision-making. For 
this purpose, the first research question (RQ 1) aims at identifying the arena 
characteristics that influence the expansion of expertise. The most con-
cise answer to the question is given in the proposed distinction between 
four different arena characteristics: placid, polarized, hierarchic and par-
ticipatory. As we have already seen, the different arena characteristics in-
volve different issues for the strategy of expansion; those issues influence 
the way in which the expansion of expertise is framed as a strategic option 
(being either an issue of style, power, enmity, or familiarity); and finally, 
the mismatch between a traditional and expanded arena involves different 
policy challenges and balancing requirements. The empirical findings con-
cerning the arena characteristics and their influence on the expansion of 
expertise are summarized in Table 3.
The second research question (RQ 2) explores how arena characteris-
tics—causing the “arena effect”—influence the process of the expansion 
of expertise. In answering RQ 1 (what are such arena characteristics), we 
have already provided an initial answer to RQ 2 (how do they influence). 
The most concise answer to RQ 2 is that the different arena characteristics 
influence the direction, speed and impact—and finally the success—of the 
expansion of expertise. The answer will be elaborated on next by consider-
ing the “cross impacts” of the arena characteristics, i.e., what bearings the 
different combinations of the arena characteristics may have on the expan-
sion of expertise. I take the liberty of providing the answer by exploring 
ideas and metaphors rather in a manner of a think-piece than in a manner 
of a summary or research note.
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As Table 3 indicates, arena characteristics can be categorized in two 
groups: actor-induced and institutional (see, Table 3). Since the two groups 
are independent dimensions (or axes) of a social arena, the “world” of possi-
ble types of arena can be framed as a four-field taxonomy. The model takes 
into account how different arena characteristics influence each other. Four 
main types of arenas resulting from the combinations of the actor-induced 
and institutional characteristics are presented in Figure 1.
Table 3 Empirical findings: arena characteristics and related arena effects
Arena 
characteristics
ARENA EFFECTS
(i.e., issues for the expansion of expertise)
A
C
T
O
R
I
N
D
U
C
E
D
Placid arenas
- low intensity of 
debate and low 
level of mobiliza-
tion by opposite 
 social forces 
Issue: “silence of the public”
- Different signal functions
- Early warning vs. tacit sign of content
- De-motivating effects
Framing: expansion of expertise as style
Policy challenge: balancing between policy 
practice and thinking
Polarized arenas
- high intensity of 
debate and high 
level of mobiliza-
tion by opposite 
 social forces
Issue: polarization
- Intensified public debate and criticism
- Dissolution of the “core set” of experts
- “Closure by polarization”
Framing: expansion of expertise as power
Policy challenge: balancing between “ra-
tional” and influential policy-making
I
N
S
T
I
T
U
T
I
O
N
A
L
Hierarchic arenas
- institutions of 
 decision-making 
elitist, centralized 
and exclusive
Issue: hierarchic policy culture
- Policy cultural resistance
- Compromising and re-orienting effects
- “Quasi-Expansion”
Framing: expansion of expertise as an 
enemy
Policy challenge: balancing between reac-
tive and proactive policy renewal
Participatory  
arenas
- institution of 
 decision-making 
based on the princi-
ples of inclusion
Issue: participatory policy culture
- Policy cultural embedding
- Involvement—instrumentality trade-off
- Creativity—stakeholding trade-off
Framing: expansion of expertise as the 
home territory
Policy challenge: balancing between in-
creasing variety and productive convergence
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The four types of policy arena are named in Figure 1 according to geo-
graphical metaphors. The metaphors “mountain massif,” “volcano,” “prai-
rie” and “rapids” characterize the nature of each arena of debate and con-
flict. The subtitles (in quotation marks) and examples relate each arena 
type to the discussion and case studies of this dissertation. How each type 
of arena influences the expansion of expertise is discussed next. In prepara-
tion for answering RQ 3, I list issues, the acknowledgement of which helps 
design more workable strategies based on the expansion of expertise.
A placid and hierarchic arena (1) can be thought of as a “mountain mas-
sif,” because it is the most stable and monolithic of the arena types. It is an 
“arena stabilized,” because such contextual signals that would trigger pol-
icy-makers’ thinking about the need for restructuring the arena are absent. 
Expansion of expertise is conceived of as an exotic style as, for example, by 
Finnish biotechnology authorities in Paper I. In the mountain massif, pol-
icy-makers lack motivation for and commitment to the expansion of exper-
tise. Due to the non-committal there is a tendency toward “Quasi Expan-
sion.” The negative experience resulting from the latter further obstructs 
initiatives that aim at expanding expertise. The result is that the expansion 
of expertise becomes isolated from policy processes, in which it can never-
theless remain as an obligatory but poorly-understood element. The final 
outcome is that the expansion of expertise, in its distorted form, merely in-
creases the cost and bureaucracy of governance and feeds dissatisfaction 
with initiatives for its renewal.
Figure 1   A typology of policy arenas
1. Mountain massif 
“Arena stabilized,” 
e.g., Finnish biotech policy, 
pre c. 2000
2. Volcano
“Arena alarmed,” 
e.g., Finnish forest biotech policy, 
post c. 2000
3. Pairie
“Arena expanded,”
e.g., innovation focused foresight
4. Rapids
“Arena floated,” 
e.g., transitional Mode 1  
department 
Hierarchic
Placid Polarized
Participatory
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To climb the mountain, i.e., to build a more positive scenario for the ex-
pansion of expertise in this arena context, attention should be paid to the 
following issues:
better reading of the status of public debate and mobilization is  –
helpful. “Silence of the public” is not necessarily a signal of public 
content, but alternatively, it can be “silence before the storm,” or a 
signal of an inadequate level of social scrutiny of public policy;
motivation through evidence is useful. An “ice ax” of pragmatic ar- –
guments (that articulate the social cost and benefit of the traditional 
vs. new policy approach) provides an effective tool for motivating 
policy-makers to expand their expertise. To gain such a tool, how-
ever, new policy approaches have to be tested and evaluated in real 
contexts of decision-making; 
stretching of policy paradigms occurs. Expansion of expertise in- –
volves both implicit and explicit conflicts between traditional and 
new ways of policy. Social scientist may help identify tensions and 
find ways of reconciling different strategic approaches and interests;
anticipation through comparison and benchmarking is beneficial.  –
Styles and debates of technical decision-making are becoming in-
creasingly homogeneous as the world becomes more globalised. 
Comparison and benchmarking of international policy debates (e.g. 
on gene technology) and related governance styles help anticipate 
forthcoming shifts in national contexts.
A polarized and hierarchic arena (2) can be called a “volcano.” A hierar-
chic culture of policy-making is the common nominator between a moun-
tain massif and volcano. A process of polarization, caused by an increas-
ing intensity of public debate and a mobilization of opposite social forces, 
transforms the mountain massif into a volcano. A volcanic arena transmits 
signals of an approaching eruption of a social conflict. Policy-makers in this 
arena context, however, can be slow to react to the “alarm signals.” If the 
polarization continues for an extended period of time, the result can be a 
paralysis of the policy process (e.g., the case of Finnish forest biotechnology 
policy, in Paper II). It then becomes critical for policy-makers to find tools 
for more effective policy, for instance by adopting means of communicat-
ing and campaigning that are similar to those used by their forceful critics. 
Expansion of expertise in this context becomes framed as an issue of power 
and influence. If influence, however, is prioritized higher than negotiation 
and agreement, the risk is that the expansion of expertise just inflames po-
larities and intensifies the paralysis of the policy process. 
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To harness the volcano, i.e., to build a more positive scenario for the ex-
pansion of expertise in this arena context, particular attention should be 
paid to the following aspects:
an early detection of the “alarm signals” is good. The sooner the so- –
cial concerns related to technical decision-making are identified, the 
better the chances of reacting to them. It is both a policy cultural and 
methodological challenge to establish systematic procedures and 
structures for an early identification of technical debates and con-
flicts (the method of “pre-assessment,” elaborated in Paper II is an 
example of an effort to develop such approaches);
conflicts can be learning processes. Conflicts open up different time  –
scales for policy learning. Policy-makers are forced to react abruptly 
as issues arise, whereas policy scientists can adopt a temporarily ex-
panded and theoretically informed perspective. If the arena has a 
short history of being volcanic, as in the context of Finnish biotech-
nology policy, this can imply a difficulty in seeing the value of treat-
ing conflicts openly through conflict study. The latter can, however, 
contribute to enhanced policy learning and conflict resolution;
a review of policy goals helps. An adequate response to an “alarm ef- –
fect” may require that not only new and more effective means are 
adopted by policy-makers,54 but also that policy goals are openly re-
viewed. Adopting an expanded set of “non-technical” policy objec-
tives, such as those related to the development of the governance ap-
proach, can help deal with “implicit risk issues” that may have a cen-
tral role in a conflict (see, Paper II);
experimentation with new policy approaches is useful. A process  –
of polarization can involve strange configurations of actors and is-
sues (e.g., the shared interest of forest industries and environmen-
tal NGOs in an anti-GM policy, see, Paper II). Even though methodo-
logical guidelines such as the RME can provide important rules of 
thumb, the particular configurations of issues and actors also calls 
for a contextually tailored approach. A conflict that relates to a very 
futuristic issue, for instance, can be a special reason for adopting an 
experimental mode in policy-making.
The metaphor for the placid and participatory arena (3) is “prairie.” 
There, in contrast to the hierarchic arena, motivation for the expansion of 
expertise is high. This results from a growing realization that the theoreti-
cal premises of the expansion of expertise hold practical value. For exam-
ple, in the context of foresight, both practitioners’ and theoreticians’ con-
ceptions of the value of foresight point to the following conclusions: fore-
sight is effective in bringing new actors into the strategic debate; it helps 
in exploring future opportunities for investment in science and innovation; 
it is a workable method for building networks of actors, sectors, markets 
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and problems (see, e.g., Paper III; Georghiou & Keenan, 2006). On a “prai-
rie,” a culture of participation prevails and the arena is placid (an exam-
ple is foresight that is focused on brainstorming the innovation potential 
of some non-controversial technology). The prairie provides, in many ways, 
the most favorable context for the expansion of expertise. While the “prai-
rie” provides a context in which expertise can be easily expanded, this type 
of arena also has some limitations. If there are no rules for stopping delib-
erations and if the mechanisms for transforming increasing requisite vari-
ety into decisions and innovations are lacking, a crisis of efficiency and ef-
fectiveness arises. There will be an overflow of unexploited visions, and the 
number of actors that are disappointed with the promise of participation 
will increase. These tendencies undermine the strategy of the expansion of 
expertise.
To effectively harvest the prairie, i.e., to build a positive and sustainable 
storyline for the expansion of expertise in this particular type of arena, at-
tention should be paid to the following issues:
the definition and anticipation of the limits of participation is help- –
ful. It is not a straightforward exercise to identify the “reasonable” 
limits of the expansion of expertise—as we have seen in the pages of 
this introduction. However, an identification of such limits can con-
tribute to more realistic planning. A starting point for such an iden-
tification process can be the clarification of the implicit and explicit 
assumptions of such limits by the actors who design the participa-
tory processes. The assumptions should be reviewed along with the 
accumulation of experiences and insights;
evaluation of participation pays off. The “prairie” blossoms with  –
new policy exercises and experiments. An evaluation of participa-
tion is necessary in order to develop governance practices in the long 
run, and to direct experimentations in the short term. That a single 
framework could serve for the evaluation of any kind of participa-
tory practice is not a plausible idea, not only because there is a great 
variety of them, but also because different arena contexts imply dif-
ferent challenges. Evaluation should meet the specific concerns of 
different types of arena;55
the building of linkages between different arenas (or stages within  –
the arena) increases momentum. Sometimes prairie-type arenas can 
emerge in the foothills of the “mountain massif.” In order to open a 
route of communication between the mountain massif and the prai-
rie, and to gain momentum for the expansion of expertise in the lat-
ter context, it is necessary to concert isolated activities. An example 
of this having happened in Finland is a recent project and report on 
participatory foresight and policy-making (Tarkka & Hintikka 2007). 
The project gathers together 11 distinct instances and examples of 
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participatory policy applications—in the patchy “prairie” context of 
Finland—on the way to build momentum for the improvement of 
citizens’ hearing mechanisms in the national context;
the scanning of “grassroots” practices is worthwhile. If prairie-type  –
culture is the prevailing condition of a policy arena, there is a con-
stant need for identifying new innovative approaches and decid-
ing which of the past approaches have become obsolete. Scanning of 
“grassroots” practices, such as new communication and knowledge-
sharing tools on the Internet, can help with these objectives. Emerg-
ing Internet-based approaches, such as wild political parties based 
on “Wiki” philosophy56 both challenge and provide new means for 
the expansion of expertise in a public policy context.
Finally, a polarized and participatory arena (4) can be called the “rapids.” 
Participation in this type of an arena is a taken-for-granted issue that does 
not meet cultural resistance in the organization. The “Mode 1 department 
in transition” (Paper IV) is an instance of rapids-type of arena. Such a de-
partment has adopted a strategy that encourages increased participation 
and interaction by various actors across epistemic boundaries. Conflicts 
emerge, when the two modes of knowledge production encounter each 
other in the university setting. (An alternative example, with a more direct 
connection to the NTE and RME, is “professional risk management” that is 
based on a thoroughly participatory approach in the resolution of a polar-
ized risk conflict.)
As in the context of the “prairie,” the approval of the participatory ap-
proach in the “rapids” can result from a growing realization by policy-mak-
ers (or conflict mediators) of its practical value for policy-making (or con-
flict resolution). The social turbulences or tensions in the broader institu-
tional setting, however, generate special requirements for the expansion of 
expertise. They involve a sense of urgency and high social stakes; the polar-
ized context also tends to politicise the process of planning and decision-
making, unlike the placid context of the “prairie.” In the “rapids,” participat-
ing actors become concerned about who decides the rules of the game and 
on what grounds—issues that are not salient in the “prairie context.” There 
are two specific risks for the expansion of expertise in the “rapids” type of 
arena. One risk is that if the “design discourse” (see, Renn 2005) is opened 
up to all possible actors (in order to design an acceptable negotiation proc-
ess) the process becomes slow, complicated and ineffective, and the “prob-
lem of expansion” becomes a reality. Another risk relates to a more exclu-
sive strategy. If participation by politically influential actors is favoured (in 
order to effectively resolve the conflict), then biases emerge, reflections be-
come more goal-oriented, and the policy (or negotiation) process can lose 
some of its creative potential.
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To survive the rapids, i.e., to successfully expand expertise in a rapids-
type arena, good balancing skills and timely actions are needed. Attention 
should be paid to the following critical issues:
consideration of the design discourse is necessary. The politicization  –
of a planning process makes it difficult to reach an agreement of an 
appropriate involvement procedure and negotiation strategy. Open-
ing up the design discourse involves an arena that “floats” accord-
ing to the needs of the stakeholders. This may help increase the so-
cial and political acceptance of the related procedures. Equally im-
portant, however, is that processes are kept running, e.g., by creating 
“forceful focuses” on the debates and by delivering specific roles to 
the participating actors.
the combination of normative rules of thumb with contextual  –
knowledge can help. An urgency in a conflict or polarized risk proc-
ess requires that prompt actions are taken. Pragmatic and moral 
rules of thumb, such as, e.g., the NTE, can help design robust pro-
cedures; and even more so when the rules of thumb are completed 
with contextual information;
the synchronization of the participatory processes with public de- –
bates and decision processes is useful. If in a “prairie” type of arena it 
may just be possible to gather “requisite variety” for different plan-
ning purposes, this seems unlikely within the rapids. In the latter 
context, there is an urgent need for handling the conflict. Synchro-
nizing a participatory procedure with public debates and decision 
processes can increase its effectiveness and policy relevance. Since a 
goal-oriented policy process tends to compromise the creativity as-
pect of deliberation, special attention should be paid to how to the 
two dimensions can be combined;
attention to the different values of the expansions of expertise is  –
needed. In a rapids-type arena there is a tendency to frame the ex-
pansion of expertise as a tool for power and effective action. Since 
some of the actors involved in a negotiation process can have differ-
ent framings (e.g., they regard the expansion of expertise as a hostile 
form of decision-making, or oppositely, they attach high symbolic 
value to the efforts to deal with a technical conflict in a democratic 
manner), it is vital for a negotiation process that no single framing 
dominates.
As we have seen, there can be quite different challenges for the ex-
pansion of expertise in the four arena contexts. It is now time to consider 
whether the acknowledgement of the “arena effects” actually provides addi-
tional value for planning or decision-making. I will discuss this next and an-
swer the last research question (RQ 3), “Can better knowledge of the ‘arena 
effect’ help design better strategies based on the expansion of expertise?”
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Let us start by reminding that the criticism of the NTE and the RME links 
the rigidity and contextual insensitivity of those models to their limited 
value for policy design. Does the identification of the “arena effects” as pro-
posed in this dissertation help deal with this problem? Drawing from the 
criticism of the referred theories (see, Section 2.6), four criteria for a “flex-
ible and contextually sensitive” account of the limits of the expansion of 
expertise can be formulated. Such an account should: 1) take into consid-
eration the contextual factors (at a meaningful level of generality), 2) with-
out succumbing to a narrow or propositional framing of the issues of sci-
ence and technology, 3) without leaning on concepts of expertise, science, 
or risks loaded with boundary problems, and 4) by offering perspectives 
and options for policy interventions. Are these criteria met by the identifi-
cation of the “arena effects”?
Criteria 1-3 are about the quality of analysis. The first criterion (1) is met, 
since the study of the “arena effect,” by definition, takes into account con-
textual factors. My understanding is that the “arena approach” allows a 
fruitful way of structuring and abstracting empirical findings concerning 
the actors, issues and dynamics of the arenas. My intention is that the ty-
pology of different arenas and “arena effects” provides a framework of ori-
entation to the contextual issues that are related to the expansion of ex-
pertise. I also believe that the second criterion (2) can be met. The arena fo-
cus opposes a propositional framing, because it does not analyse the issues 
in isolation but regards them as part of the “drama” of the actors and their 
resource mobilization efforts. The third criterion (3) is more challenging. 
This is due to the fact that any form of theorizing carries with it the risk 
of vague abstraction. I have defended my position (in Section 3 on meth-
odology) by referring to the “grounded generalism” approach. The role of 
theorizing, according to this view, is in the naming and interpreting of em-
pirical findings and in the building of heuristic models that allow learning 
from experience. 
The fourth criterion (4) is about the policy relevance of analysis. Can the 
identification of the “arena effects” offer perspectives and options for policy 
design and thus have implications for the definition of relevant expertise in 
technical decision-making? A “no” answer to this question could be formu-
lated by claiming that the study of the “arena effect” only provides ex post 
accounts or case specific information. This is not my answer, for two rea-
sons. One aspect is that an increased sensitivity to different types of arena 
can indeed provide a starting point for designing customized rather than 
“Pavlovian” strategies57 of expertise. To take an example, the Danish-type 
consensus conference has often been proposed as the way to support pub-
lic deliberation and policy-making on ambiguous and challenging technol-
ogies, such as modern biotechnology. On the basis of past experience (see, 
Paper I), however, such an approach is more difficult to adopt in the Finn-
ish than in the Danish context. This is understandable, because the Finn-
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ish arena of (bio)technology policy is rooted in the mountain massif of na-
tional political history, which is coloured by a lack of tradition in critical 
debate, and a high degree of trust in experts, authorities and technologies. 
The Danish policy arena, in contrast, is rooted in a prairie-type tradition of 
grass-roots dialogue and citizens’ participation, and there is also an insti-
tutionalized history of practice in participatory S&T policy (see, e.g., Klüver, 
et al. 2006b; Jamison & Lassen 2004; Jamison 1999a). Positive cultural re-
sources for the expansion of expertise in Finland can be found in its recent 
orientation towards high tech and in its long history of futures studies. 
These resources were actually combined in a recent ICT-based project that 
collected “weak signals” for Tekes (the Finnish Funding Agency for Technol-
ogy and Innovation) on the options and threats for Finland’s future in the 
year 2020. The result was more than 3000 visions from a large collection 
of R&D experts, young activists, societal actors and business people.58 The 
“weak signals” project represents quite a new approach with its wide scope 
of visioning in the arena of Finnish S&T policy. 
The second aspect is that a better understanding of the arena-specific 
factors can help anticipate what specific challenges are related to the ex-
pansion of expertise, and, at best, in finding means for dealing with them. 
The “weak signals” exercise, for example, represents a new, “prairie” type of 
instrument for increasing the requisite variety in Finnish technology pol-
icy. Even though the evaluation of that exercise is yet to come, we can ex-
pect that some of the main challenges of the project will be related to a 
productive convergence of the collected visions. It is a challenge to which 
we can expect complicated managerial rather than straightforward politi-
cal remedies.
To summarize the answer to RQ 3, lessons from the “arena effects” can 
provide means for the design of more realistic strategies of the expansion 
of expertise. These lessons cannot be the only basis for future action, how-
ever. Also needed are normative principles and guidelines, such as those 
suggested by the NTE and the RME. Without the latter elements, policies 
would be based merely on power, influence or narrow-minded practical-
ity; not on principles of democracy and fairness. In this respect the two ap-
proaches are complementary rather than competing.
The next section (Section 5) closes the introduction of this dissertation 
with a discussion on future research needs for better understanding and 
management of the expansion of expertise.
4  Exploring the arena effects of the expansion of expertise
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5  Future research needs
Why should one be interested in the phenomenon of the expansion of ex-
pertise? Which of the issues that are related to it are still unclear or prob-
lematic and therefore deserve further attention? What further research 
questions does the study of the “arena effect” open? These are the final 
questions, the ones with which I conclude this introductory chapter.
The expansion of expertise is a longer term trend in the governance of 
science and technology. It has a history in the ideologically inspired par-
ticipatory movement of the 1960s. Its parallel evolution can be followed 
through the development of several fields related to S&T policy, such as risk 
assessment, technology assessment and foresight. Currently the trend of 
the expansion of expertise is widely established; it has a rather more prag-
matic than ideological motivation; it refers to multiple different practices 
and approaches, and there is an increasing interest in developing and eval-
uating those practices. The expansion of expertise is gaining terrain in the 
core work in S&T strategy-making. Since science and technology are, and 
will be, among the key drivers of societal change, it is of general (sociologi-
cal) interest to try to understand whether the expansion of expertise will 
make a difference in the future conduct of S&T.
To my understanding, there are three problem areas related to the ex-
pansion of expertise that deserve more attention: first, the definition of its 
limits; second, the development and understanding of its methods and ap-
proaches; and third, an understanding of how policy cultures influence it. 
This dissertation sheds some new light on these problems. At the same 
time, I acknowledge that some aspects of these problem areas still remain 
unresolved.
First, the normative theories of expertise have opened the discussion on 
how to define appropriate levels of expertise on the basis of different quali-
ties of science and risk. As a commentary and complementary perspective 
to these approaches, this dissertation has introduced the concept of the 
“arena effect”; proposed some contextual distinctions (e.g., the four types 
of policy arena), and discussed their relevance with regard to some of the 
key assumption of the NTEs (e.g., how the “problem of expansion” relates 
to the different types of arena). I have also recommended different arena 
types by pointing out issues that will most likely emerge in different types 
of arena, and how the issues can be responded to within them (e.g., in the 
context of a “mountain massif” it is crucial to anticipate and work with pol-
icy cultural tensions, whereas in the context of the “prairie” there is a need 
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to clarify participants’ understanding of the limits of the expansion proc-
ess.) Despite these steps, further research is needed to better bridge the gap 
between normative and descriptive-contextual theories of the expansion of 
expertise. That work could begin with a consideration of how the contex-
tual models can better be integrated with the normative models of exper-
tise. Such work might then result in a more contextually sensitive and inte-
grated model of expertise.
Second, since a systematic research and development of the participa-
tory method through testing, variation, comparison, evaluation and theory-
building is still at an early stage, there is currently a demand for both meth-
odological “basic research” and more practical development. The arena ap-
proach that is elaborated on the pages of this dissertation helps to identify 
contextual factors and conditions and to analyse issues of framing and re-
source mobilization, especially at the early stages of a policy process (i.e., in 
the framing and decision-making stages). I believe that in the future there 
is a particular need for developing contextually sensitive new methods that 
strengthen the participatory dimension both at the early and late stages of 
a policy process.
Since the development and application of participatory methods are 
costly, there is a constant pressure to do those things cost-effectively. This 
is a factor that supports co-operation in methodological work, both at the 
national and international level. Co-operation between more and less expe-
rienced organisations not only supports methodological knowledge trans-
fer, but also helps build political legitimacy to projects aiming at introduc-
ing new approaches, especially in less participatory cultures of S&T policy. 
An encouraging example is the activity of the Danish Board of Technology 
to practice knowledge transfer and involve international partners in Euro-
pean and global participatory exercises.59
Third, cultural and contextual impacts on organisations and decision 
processes have previously been studied in several disciplines including, e.g., 
institutional and organisational theory, political science, and cultural the-
ory. Specific to the typology developed here is that it has been tailored to 
the study of the expansion of expertise; its starting point is in empirical 
case studies that focus on processes related to the expansion of expertise; 
and its outcomes are contextual implications for the expansion of exper-
tise. The way the model of policy arenas is applied here contributes to an 
increased understanding of the cultural and contextual conditions of the 
expansion of expertise. I acknowledge there are issues that have only par-
tially been treated in this dissertation but would deserve more system-
atic attention. A major issue is the dynamic relation among types of pol-
icy arena. We have seen that there can be various triggers for a shift from 
one type of arena to another. Examples of such triggers are an extended 
risk conflict (Paper II) and the dynamic role of expertise, as shown for in-
stance in the case where foresight is intentionally applied as a tool for pol-
5  Future research needs
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icy cultural renewal (Paper III). The study and theory of policy arenas can 
provide some insights to the question of how policy cultures change; fur-
ther research could seek connections between this and other theories ex-
plaining policy cultural dynamics. One of the most interesting connections 
that would deserve more systematic study is between the arena theory and 
the “theory of organisational fields” (e.g., Greenwood, et al. 2002; Scott 1995; 
DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Abbott 1988). International studies and compari-
sons would enable a “natural” empirical framework for conducting studies 
of policy cultural dynamics.
Finally, the exploration of arena effects in this dissertation involves 
ideas that have to be further developed and scrutinized. The list of “arena 
effects” provided here is not in any sense exhaustive. While the scrutiny of 
the findings requires further empirical research and the identification of 
new kinds of arena effects is an open line for the study of policy arenas, I 
think it is important to link such a research agenda to broader issues. One 
of the main issues involved is the social control of technology (and most 
generally, the co-evolution of science, technology and society).
Already a quarter-of-a-century ago, Collingridge (1980, p. 19) summa-
rized the dilemma of the social control of technology as follows:
 . . . attempting to control a technology is difficult, and not rarely impossi-
ble, because during its early stages, when it can be controlled, not enough 
can be known about its harmful consequences to warrant controlling its 
development; but by the time these consequences are apparent, control 
has become costly and slow.
The essence of controlling a technology, according to Collingridge, is not 
in predicting its social impacts, but in retaining the ability to change it. His 
point is that it is of the greatest importance to learn what the obstacles to 
the maintenance of this freedom of control are. Since the expansion of ex-
pertise promises to increase the domain of social control by making tech-
nical decision-making more informed, socially acceptable and democratic 
while the arena effect risks compromising that process, Collingridge’s in-
sight can be a valuable guideline for the orientation of future research. The 
dream of socially controlled technical decision-making comes true when 
new and expanded strategies of expertise are developed in relation to a rig-
orous study of arenas and their effects.
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Notes
 1 Paper III is related to the following reports, in which Rask is a co-author: Bedsted, et al. 
(2007); Klüver, et al. (2006a, 2006b).
 2 The key argument of this introductory chapter was presented in a paper “On the rationales 
and limits of the expansion of expertise” at the Negotiating the Future seminar, 7 June 2007, 
at the University of Oslo. 
 3 Schwarz and Thompson (1990, p. 39) argue that the established thinking pattern is based 
on the separation of technical facts and social values. By referring to anthropologists and 
sociologists of knowledge, who, according to them, “. . . have shown us that what are con-
sidered facts depends ultimately on an accepted framework of social (and therefore evalua-
tive) premises . . .” they reject this position. To make it clear, I share their “social constructiv-
ist” view of science as being a social activity, and of facts as being entwined with values.
 4 For example, according to Statistics Finland, R&D expenditure in Finland was 3.5 per cent 
of GDP in 2003, which is the highest in the OECD after Sweden; the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) ranked Finland first in Growth Competitiveness in 2005, followed by the USA (for 
R&D statistics, see <www.research.fi>).
 5 Kuitunen and Lähteenmäki-Smith (Manuscript) report that many of the representatives of 
the Finnish “technology elite” whom they surveyed call for the democratization and open-
ing up of this policy area to new influences and actors. “Multi-vocal” policy was also a cen-
tral theme of ProACT, the recent, biggest-ever Finnish research programme on technology 
policy (see, <http://proact.ktm.fi/>).
 6 For example, Wynne 1989, has since a long time criticized and called for a change in the ex-
pert-focused culture of UK risk management: “Many such decisions are determined in the 
United Kingdom via expert advisory committees. These usually provide no record of meet-
ings, of how issues are defined, how diverse evidence is examined and judged and different 
disciplinary inputs reconciled. Their membership is often narrow in disciplinary terms, and 
they are not held to account for their judgements (except in very indirect ways via Parlia-
ment or the media if the issue is sufficiently controversial). All these could be changed.” (Cf. 
Wynne 2005.)
 7 I explain the main concepts applied in this dissertation in Section Two.
 8 In the current debate on “upstream public engagement” (see, e.g., Irwin 2008; Wilsdon & 
Willis 2004) the “upstream” is understood as the early stages of the R&D (e.g., HM 2005) 
or S&T governance process (e.g., (e.g., Heiskanen 2006). Since the term “upstream” is thus 
loaded with meaning in this debate, in which research education is generally a lacking el-
ement, the latter could be called (quite ironically so) an “underground wellspring” of ex-
panded expertise.
 9 The terms “problematique” and “resolutique” have been used by the Club of Rome, the pre-
vious to denote the “interwoven mess of problems” (related to world sustainability), the lat-
ter to denote the coordinated set of efforts to deal with them (see, FICOR 1997).
 10 The chief editor of Social Studies of Science, Michael Lynch, together with Simon Cole, claims 
that the field of Science and Technology Studies has undergone a normative turn, due to re-
peated calls for research that intervenes in public controversies about science and technol-
ogy (Lynch & Cole 2005).
 11 I am grateful to Les Levidow for the suggestion of adopting the term “expansion” to de-
scribe the broadening of expertise, and to cover new actors and knowledge perspectives.
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 12 The key concepts presented in this section are central to this introduction’s synthetic dis-
cussion, and thus reflect my thinking after the papers included here were completed.
 13 The Oxford English Dictionary Online defines it as: a) expert opinion or knowledge, often 
obtained through the action of submitting a matter to, and its consideration by, experts; an 
expert’s appraisal, valuation, or report; b) the quality or state of being expert; skill or expert-
ness in a particular branch of study or sport.
 14 Certified experts, in this terminology, are academically or professionally accredited scien-
tists and technologists, whereas non-experts such as ordinary citizens are devoid of such 
status; in the case of being called “experience-based experts,” they may be considered as 
having special technical expertise, by virtue of their experience.
 15 Collins & Evans (2002) repeatedly refer to the lesson from the sociology of scientific knowl-
edge that all scientific and technical debates necessarily draw on “extra-scientific factors.” 
This indicates a broad conception of the domain of S&T.
 16 Renn (2005, p. 78) gives a distinct definition for “governance” at the global level, where it re-
fers to “. . . the horizontally organized structure of functional self-regulation encompassing 
state and non-state actors bringing about collectively binding decisions without superior 
authority.”
 17 Heiskanen (2006) has called the second type of participatory activity “top-down ‘engage-
ment’ exercises.”
 18 For a beautiful example of game theory, see Schelling 1980.
 19 Karl Michelssen, the historian of technology, for example, describes the first stage of West-
ern technology policy, from the era of nation-building to the first decades of the 20th Cen-
tury, as an era of “passive” policy-making. It was focused on infrastructural projects such as 
canals, roads, bridges and fortifications, and on the building of universities and other insti-
tutions of higher education (Michelssen 1993).
 20 We can see an evolution from the model of “ladders” to the one of an “escalator,” described 
in Section 2.6.
 21 According to Bruun, et al., transdisciplinarity (in the realm of sustainability) can be defined 
as “. . . collaborative research and problem solving that cross both disciplinary boundaries 
and sectors of society, engaging a shift from science on/about society towards science for/
with society.”
 22 Rationale: “A reasoned exposition of principles; an explanation or statement of reasons; a 
set of reasoned rules or directions. The fundamental reason, the logical or rational basis (of 
anything)” (Oxford English Dictionary Online).
 23 Trade-off: A balance achieved between two desirable but incompatible features; a sacrifice 
made in one area to obtain benefits in another; a bargain, a compromise (Oxford English 
Dictionary Online).
 24 This kind of argument has also sparked criticism. According to Wynne, for example, the 
supposition that a “. . . certainty-craving public would shut down all innovation,” if contin-
gencies were to be displayed (through an open debate), is simply based on a false model of 
the public (Wynne 2005).
 25 Lysenkoism: Belief in or advocacy of the views of the Russian agronomist T. D. Lysenko 
(1898-1976), who opposed modern genetics and advocated neo-Lamarckian views and who 
for a time achieved great influence in Soviet Russia (Oxford English Dictionary Online). Re-
garding “Lysenkoism and the like,” Collins and Evans (2002) refer to “. . . cases where state 
power is used to over-rule scientific conclusions that are subject to broad consensus within 
the international scientific community.”
 26 Collins and Evans (2003) have defended their argument at a programmatic level, and also 
introduced some new analytical concepts, e.g., “iniquitously-” vs. “scientistically-” framed 
problems.
 27 There are three main types of risk problems in this terminology—complex, uncertain and 
ambiguous—with the following definitions (Renn, 2005). Complexity: “Complexity refers to 
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the difficulty of identifying and quantifying causal links between a multitude of potential 
causal agents and specific observable effects.” Uncertainty: “A state of knowledge in which, 
although the factors influencing the issues are identified, the likelihood of any adverse ef-
fect of the effects themselves cannot be precisely described.” Ambiguity: “Giving rise to sev-
eral meaningful and legitimate interpretations of accepted risk assessment results.”
 28 On closer inspection, there is some discussion on the contextual factors related to both 
models. Collins and Evans (2002), for example, refer to the particularities of different pol-
icy cultures, such as those in economic policy, where instead of the urge for participation, 
the tendency in most major economies has been toward independent central banks and 
an elite group of decision-makers (cf., Francis 2002). Renn (2004, 2005) discusses the con-
nection between established ways of stakeholder involvement and (paradigmatic) styles of 
policy-making (“adversarial,” “fiduciary,” “consensual” and “corporatist”).
 29 Since the empirical materials, as well as the methods applied are reported in the articles, 
I do not review them in detail here. An overview of the research topics, approaches and 
methods is provided in Table 1 (in Section 1).
 30 This program is a tool broadly used by social scientists for the conduct of qualitative con-
tent analysis of various empirical material. The program does not involve any theoretical 
assumption about the analysis, but assists in managing the data and conducting the em-
pirical analysis systematically.
 31 I was responsible for conducting the analysis and reporting of a two-round monitoring ex-
ercise in the referred EU project. The results are reported in Bedsted et al. 2007.
 32 Coherence: “Consistency in reasoning, or relating, so that one part of the discourse does not 
destroy or contradict the rest’; harmonious connexion of the several parts, so that the whole 
‘hangs together’” (Oxford English Dictionary Online).
 33 There are, roughly speaking, two opposite approaches to the study of how policy context 
influence the process of the expansion of expertise. One way is to start from established 
theories and typologies of policy cultures, which are exploited as interpretative tools in 
the analysis of policy processes. One of the most famous cultural typologies is suggested 
by “Cultural Theory” (Grenstad 2003; Douglas & Wildawsky 1997; Rayner 1992; Schwarz & 
Thompson 1990). It is based on a distinction between four (sometimes 3-5) main types of 
organisational cultures with different rationalities: the hierarchist, the egalitarian, the indi-
vidualist and the fatalist. The paradigms introduced in Paper I come close to the typology of 
cultural theory. The “enlightenment paradigm” resonates with the rationality of hierarchist 
culture, the “critical paradigm” with egalitarian culture, and the “economic paradigm” with 
individualistic culture. An alternative classification distinguishes between the fiduciary 
(i.e., patronage), the consensual, the corporatist and the adversarial policy cultures (Renn 
2005; Renn 2004; Jamison 1999b). The cultural typologies provide explanations of why or-
ganisations behave as they do and why certain processes are slow to change due to the 
deeply rooted cultural patterns (see, e.g., Hänninen 2007). A problem, when starting from 
established typologies is that they take fundamental epistemic assumptions for granted, 
while at the same time, they fail to pay enough attention to more subtle distinctions and 
dynamics that bear upon the practical outcomes for the expansion of expertise. Therefore, 
in this introductory chapter, I have adopted a more exploratory approach. My starting point 
has been a synthetic analysis of the empirical findings of the papers (concerning the con-
textual and practical limitations of the expansion of expertise), and the result is thus a new 
heuristic model of the characteristics and types of arenas, which best helps explain the em-
pirically observed phenomena.
 34 “Foresight” refers to the policy-oriented “hybrid forums” in the S&T-related area, based on 
the interaction between industrial, academic, governmental and social actors. Participation 
is the starting point of current foresight activity. In reality, however, there is a great vari-
ation, in the nature and scope of participation, between specific foresight exercises (see, 
Klüver, et al. 2006a).
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 35 In some earlier presentations of this material at conferences, I was asked about how study-
ing citizens’ participation in the context of Finnish biotechnology policy could be relevant 
if such related activities were scarce, and more severely, if the public outrage that would 
have necessitated those activities was absent.
 36 Hukkinen, et al. (1990) make a similar, “dialectic” argument, that is, that the way toward re-
solving the agricultural drainage dilemma in California is to polarize the conflict through 
the organizational division of labor. Their conclusion relates to the dysfunctional effects of 
the status quo, and to the lack of polarization.
 37 This is also the problem with the argument: one cannot equate stringent regulation with 
sound public policy. However, what is interesting with Graham’s argument is that it makes 
an empirical case, where “silence of the public” presumably implies negative effects on 
public policy.
 38 The surprise caused by the contradictory interpretations of this issue was one of the reasons 
why I continued, in Paper II, to study the influence of actors on the process of policy-making.
 39 See, <http://www.joensuu.fi/ biologia/sopanen/index.htm>.
 40 In the following summer, a new act of sabotage led to the destruction of the GM potato field 
test site in Jokioinen, see  <http://www.bioteknologia.info/uutiset/maatalous___ruoka/
fi_FI/boreal_koe_tuhottu/>.
 41 To be more exact, the European controversy over biotechnology was entered for the first 
time in Finland during the “watershed years,” 1996-1997, as in most other European coun-
tries. During that time, media peaks were also reported in Finland, as reactions to the im-
portation of Monsanto’s genetically modified soya strain, called “Roundup Ready,” and to 
the birth of Dolly, the first animal proclaimed to be cloned from an adult cell. The tone of 
the debate and action, at that time, however, remained modest, especially compared to 
that in many other European countries (see, e.g., Bauer & Gaskell 2002; Rusanen, et al. 2001; 
 Levidow 1999a; Durant, et al. 1998).
 42 This suggestion can be called more generally the “genomically informed but non-trans-
genic” alternative (see Wynne 2005).
 43 This may sound premature. On the other hand, in Sweden, for example, there has been an 
innovation company, SweTree Technologies, operating in the field of forest biotechnology 
since 1999, see <http://www.swetreetechnologies.se>. New regulatory institutes or agen-
cies, more generally, can provide means to overcome some of the ethical and social dilem-
mas of modern biotechnology. For a recent proposition, see Fukuyama & Furger 2006.
 44 One could argue that “participatory processes per se make procedures more fair and so-
cially acceptable, regardless of any practical influence” (a counter-argument raised by one 
of the pre-examiners of this dissertation). The problem with that argument, however, is 
that it treats the “participatory process” as a black box that automatically transforms proce-
dures into being more democratic. If the box is opened, however, it contains a great variety 
of tools and practices, which can be used for different purposes, by various actors, with dif-
ferent rates of success. It would be unrealistic to assume that all these processes are condu-
cive to more democratic processes (e.g., see the next note on “performance participation”). 
In the Finnish case discussed here, one of the main problems was a limited, or, at best, am-
biguous connectivity between the participatory and the regulatory process.
 45 Kothari (2002, p. 149) writes of a similar phenomenon, which he calls “performance partici-
pation.” He describes it as follows: “The tools provided can limit the performance so that 
the performers are unable to convey what they want to; the stage has been set by others 
and the form of the performance similarly guided by them. The resulting communication 
or dialogue is then fraught with confusion and ambiguity.”
 46 This can be done by ensuring that the newly-introduced actors can participate effectively. 
This often calls for the mobilization of new kinds of resources, including an access to sci-
entific evidence, money for the compensation of the efforts of the participants, and an ex-
plicit delivery of responsibilities in the participatory policy processes, and so on.
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 47 Guidelines on Scientific Analysis in Policy Making, Office of Science and Technology, 2005 
<http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file9767.pdf>.
 48 Science and Innovation Investment Framework, 2004-2014, HM Treasury, 2004 <http://
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/spending_review/spend_sr04/associated_documents/spending_
sr04_science.cfm>.
 49 See, <http://www.sciencewise.org.uk/>.
 50 An analogous problem that we discuss in Paper IV is that an intense and far-reaching 
transformation of research education in the direction of “Mode 2” puts a discipline’s iden-
tity under strain.
 51 The High Level Expert Group appointed by the European Commission, for example, defines 
foresight as, “(a) systematic, participatory, future intelligence gathering . . .” (EC 2002b). 
 52 In some cases, however, foresight has a more direct role in public policy. The Czech national 
foresight exercise (2001-2004), for example, was directly applied in the ranking of the pri-
ority research areas defined in the national research programme (see, also for other exam-
ples, Klüver et al, 2006).
 53 I hope that by discussing the limits of the expansion of expertise I have not played “devil’s 
advocate,” since it is nevertheless a policy strategy that I find in most cases well justified.
 54 There are two problematic ways in which policy agencies can react to the “alarm effect.” 
One approach defends the domain of activities of an agency by relying on its narrowest for-
mal and legal role, with the resulting risk for its credibility and efficiency (see, e.g., the case 
of the BGT, in Paper II). Another approach adopts more effective means for the advance-
ment of hierarchically defined goals, with a subsequent risk of inflaming social polarities.
 55 As my own contribution to the evaluation of participation in technology assessment, in the 
Finnish context of S&T policy, I have proposed a framework that builds on the premises of 
futures studies (Rask 2007). 
 56 See, e.g.,  <http://www.wikipuolue.fi/>.
 57 Black, et al. 2005 use the notion of “Pavlovian regulation” to describe how governments 
and administrations are conditioned by the experience of negative mass-media attention 
to create low-intelligence regulatory innovation in a very short space of time (in a man-
ner similar to the way Pavlov’s dogs were conditioned to salivate at the sound of a bell). The 
strength of such regulation is that it is economic; the weakness is that it can be based on 
an inadequate problem- and need-analysis.
 58 The project referred to was organised by Tekes, together with eight national-level R&D 
agencies. The project applies an internet-based tool for the collection, structuring and eval-
uation of the weak signals (see, <http://www.tekes.fi/TilastotJaVaikutukset/ennakointi.
html>. 
 59 I am personally being involved in two of this kind of projects, the one called “World Wide 
Views on Global Warming,” in which citizens all over the world are consulted by a “citizen 
summit” method, on their positions on the issues and questions central to the negotiations 
at the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP15) in Copenhagen 2009 (see, http://
www.wwviews.net/). The other project is an EU-funded project called “Citizen Visions on 
Science, Technology and innovation,” in which a new long-range participatory method for 
scanning emerging issues for European S&T will be developed. The point is that this kind 
of international co-operation is crucial for the introduction of the new approach, e.g., in the 
Finnish “mountain massif” type of S&T policy arena.
Notes
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Appendix 1 
Summary of the research questions, key literatures and main findings of 
the papers in this dissertation
Paper I analyses the introduction and development of citizens’ participa-
tion in Finnish biotechnology policy. The research frame is problem-centred 
and analogous to that often used in the study of the social construction of 
technological artefacts (Pinch & Bijker 1999). The focus is on the competing 
and contradictory conceptions concerning the applicability of citizens’ par-
ticipation in policy-making, a phenomenon that the paper calls the “prob-
lem of citizens’ participation.” Paper I has a theoretical background in the 
sociology of public understanding of science (see, e.g., Michael 2001; Miller 
2001; Dierkes & Grote 2000; Locke 1999; Miettinen & Väliverronen 1999; 
Michael 1998; Sjøberg & Kallerud 1997; Irwin & Wynne 1996; Irwin 1995; 
Wynne 1995). Drawing from that literature and its ideas about the state, 
S&T and citizenship, the paper distinguishes between three paradigms of 
participation in policy-making: the enlightenment, the economic and the 
critical paradigms. 
Paper I combines paradigm-based sociological reflection with the evalu-
ation of policy practices. This takes place through an operational evaluation 
framework that is applied to the analysis and comparison of participatory 
activities engaged in by Finnish biotechnology policy agencies. Paper I con-
cludes that the enlightenment and economic paradigms are the dominant 
frames, while the critical paradigm receives only marginal support from 
the civil servants interviewed. Through the analysis of the organising of a 
“Hanasaari Conference,” in the year 2002, in which the public authorities 
aimed at a new opening for a structured public discussion on biotechnol-
ogy, but where the outcome became more like public education of science, 
Paper I claims that new policy practices cannot be effectively developed if 
the practices introduced are incompatible with the existing policy style and 
thinking pattern, as is currently the case.
Paper II is a case study of Finnish forest biotechnology. It explores the dy-
namics of a risk process, and its implications for policy-making. The em-
pirical analysis is based on the application of the social arena theory and 
method (Jaeger, et al. 2001; Renn 1992). 
Paper II also has the objective of developing a new approach for risk 
“pre-assessment” (see, Renn, 2005). Pre-assessment is defined as the first 
step in the risk handling chain that helps estimate appropriate risk govern-
ance strategies, such as the need for public participation, options for stake-
holder involvement and the demand for new kinds of organizational capac-
Appendix 1
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ities—questions crucially related to the expansion of expertise. The paper 
argues that despite many insights into pre-assessment within the field of 
risk studies (e.g., Böhm, et al. 2001; Flynn, et al. 2001; Jaeger, et al. 2001; Lash, 
et al. 2000; Lupton 1999; Bauer 1997; Krimsky & Golding 1992), it suffers 
from a lack of robust methodological tools and approaches. The paper elab-
orates the new approach based on the social arena method and the identi-
fication of “closure mechanisms” (Pinch & Bijker 1999; Misa 1997).
Particular to the Finnish forest biotechnology arena is that the number 
of driving forces is small, forest industries are committed to a policy that 
is negative to forest biotechnology R&D, and a small environmental NGO 
has effectively “filled the vacuum” of public debate and criticism. Paper II 
explains the difficulty of defining an acceptable agenda for forest biotech-
nology R&D through a process of polarization in which the key actors have 
increasingly invested in opposite value commitments and social prestige. 
Paper II identifies options for policy interventions, for example, in better 
distinguishing between the different lines of R&D, in the increasing of the 
number of the driving forces, and in the organizing of risk exercises such as 
risk scenario workshops among interdisciplinary expert teams. The study 
also indicates that a risk process is a test case, for public authorities, of the 
transparency of information and of the ability to maintain open and proac-
tive policy-making.
Paper III is a study of the dynamics and scope of participation in European 
Foresight. “Foresight” refers to the policy-oriented “hybrid forums” in the 
S&T-related area, based on the interaction between industrial, academic, 
governmental and social actors (see, e.g., Barré 2001; Brown, et al. 2001; 
Georghiou 1996; Martin 1996). 
The main participants in European foresight exercises, according to Pa-
per III, are civil servants, high-level researchers and industrial actors. By an-
alysing the experiences of foresight coordinators in the introduction of a 
higher “requisite variety” (i.e., an increase in the number and heterogene-
ity of actors or knowledge perspectives) the study finds support for the ex-
istence of two kinds of trade-offs between increasing requisite variety and 
productive convergence (Rip, et al. 2004; Rip 2003; Callon, et al. 2001; Rip, 
et al. 2000). One is called the “Involvement-Instrumentality” trade-off, with 
reference to Renn’s (2006) notion that an early involvement of the public 
in deliberative processes may compromise the objective of efficient and ef-
fective policy implementation. The other is called the “Creativity-Stakehold-
ing” trade-off, with reference to the hypothesis of Georghiou and Keenan 
(2005), that consensus and stakeholding can be a trade-off between crea-
tivity and insight. The paper collects lessons on how to counterbalance the 
mutually exclusive inclinations. Examples of such measures, developed in 
detail in the paper, include: an access to influence, definition of the com-
munities of interests, decision-oriented and multi-layered foresight meth-
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odologies, mediation, efficient task definition and management, the nomi-
nation through personal qualifications, the evaluation of participation as-
pects of foresight, the building of implementation functions in foresight, 
the selection of “champions” and a high level of publicity. 
Paper IV discusses the “Mode 2 effect,” i.e., the implications for research ed-
ucation of the transition from a Mode 1 to a Mode 2 context of knowledge 
production. The paper reconstructs the hypothesis of Gibbons, et al., (2000) 
on the transition from the “traditional” discipline-oriented Mode 1, to Mode 
2, where knowledge production is institutionally distributed, produced in 
a context of application, problem-driven and transdisciplinary (the “Mode 
2 hypothesis”). Paper IV reviews the debate on the Mode 2 hypothesis (see, 
e.g., Neumann 2002; Grey 2001; Hatchuel 2001; Huff & Huff 2001; Muller 
& Subutzky 2001; Nieminen & Kaukonen 2001; Weingart 1997), and con-
cludes that there is ample evidence for many of the claims of Gibbons, et 
al., (2000). In order to analyze the challenges for research education ensu-
ing from the assumed shift, the paper proposes a distinction between Mode 
1 and Mode 2 Departments.
Building on the analysis of the experiences of research students and 
senior researchers at a transitional university laboratory, Paper IV inno-
vates means of developing research education in “Mode 1 departments in 
transition.” Paper IV recommends an expanded set of activities—writing 
applications, external and internal lecturing, teaching, organising courses 
and conferences, editing and reviewing books, working in multidisciplinary 
teams, writing doctoral dissertations as article compilations, popularising 
or debating research in the popular press, carrying out duties in academic 
societies, and so on—that could be incorporated in research education and 
formally credited to the research students. Paper IV argues that a trade-off 
between Mode 1 and Mode 2 types of skills and curricula is needed in re-
search education.
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